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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the preclusive effect given a judgment has been
limited by the doctrine of mutuality of collateral estoppel: A party to
litigation may not invoke the benefits of a prior judgment to preclude an opponent unless that party would have been bound had the
prior judgment gone the other way. 1 The mutuality doctrine has for
1. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper, Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912); Keokuk & Western R.R. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 317 (1894); REsTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68
CoLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (1968).
The traditional rationale for the doctrine of mutuality is that a lawsuit is "a means of
settling a dispute between litigants," Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143,
145 (3d Cir. 1943) (emphasis added), and that a party, in order to be bound, must have had his
day in court, 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.411(1), at 1252 (2d ed. 1974). While one
against whom a judgment has been entered has certainly had his day in court against the
adversary in that suit, he has not had the opportunity to be heard in opposition to a stranger to
that litigation. See id. 10.412(1), at 1811.
Moore and Currier offer an alternative statement of the mutuality doctrine to the effect
that "one who invokes the conclusive effect of a judgment must have been either a party or one
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some years been the subject of sustained and vigorous attack from
in privity with a party to the suit in which the judgment was rendered." Moore & Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 302 (1961). In multi-party
situations, the mutuality doctrine does have the effect of denying the benefits of collateral
estoppel to one who was not previously a party or in privity with a party, but this is properly
attributable to the interaction between the requirements of due process and the mutuality doctrine, rather than to mutuality alone. In general, due process prevents a judgment from
binding one who was not a party to the suit in which it was rendered. See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940). There is, however, no due process requirement as such that one
must have been a party in order to invoke the benefits of a prior judgment. This is the province of mutuality. See Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 375 (Alaska 1970) (carefully observing the distinction between who is bound and who is benefited), discussed in text at notes
158-66 infra-, Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects ofPrior Litigation, 39 lowAL. REv. 217,
241-42 (1954).
Combining the due process requirement (that one must be a party or in privity with a party
in order to be bound) with the mutuality requirement (that one must be bound in order to raise
an estoppel) leads readily to the "identity of parties" rule. While the "identity of parties"
statement of mutuality leads to a proper result in most cases, it is not a precise statement of the
rule and tends to hinder analysis. Consider the preclusive effect given a criminal judgment in
a related civil action, Moore & Currier, supra at 302 n.1. An acquittal in a criminal trial does
not bar the state in a later civil suit because of the extraordinary burden of persuasion required
for a criminal conviction. United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
492-94 (1950). Yet, for much the same reason, a conviction may be conclusive against the
defendant in the subsequent civil suit brought by the government. Local 167, International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934). Under these circumstances,
Moore and Currier note, the "identity of parties" test is met but the requirement of true mutuality is not, since the state can invoke the benefits of the criminal conviction in subsequent civil
litigation although it would not have been bound had the judgment gone the other way.
Writers on the subject tend to be insensitive to the distinction between the "identity of
parties" test and the ''would have been bound" requirement of mutuality: Moore and Currier,
for example, state that "(t]he doctrine of privity qualifies both the requirement of identity of
parties bound and the requirement of mutuality." Moore & Currier, supra at 330. While the
doctrine ofprivity may make the requirement of identity of parties (or more precisely the due
process requirement that a court obtain personal jurisdiction over those whose rights are to be
adjudicated) easier to meet, it in no sense affects the mutuality doctrine-a privy meets the
mutuality requirement simply because he is, or would have been, bound by the prior judgment.
Another writer has claimed that a case involving in rem jurisdiction constitutes an exception to mutuality since judgments in rem "are binding and conclusive, not only upon the parties actually litigating in the cause, but upon all others." von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38
YALE L.J. 299, 304 n.15 (1929) (citing 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 525 (10th ed. 1894)).
Obviously, in rem jurisdiction is not subject to the limitations ofin personamjurisdiction, but
it creates no exception to the doctrine of mutuality. If a litigant may plead a judgment in rem
to which he was not a party, it is only because he too would have been similarly bound had it
gone the other way.
A few examples illustrating the doctrine of mutuality may prove helpful:
A woman is injured in a car accident and successfully establishes the negligence of the
driver. Her husband cannot avail himself of the favorable judgment in a subsequent suit for
loss of consortium. Neither a party nor a privy to the prior action, he could not have been
bound by an adverse judgment. Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49, 51 A.2d 46 (1947). But see
Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970), discussed in text at notes 158-66 infra.
Thirty manufacturers employ an identical process to manufacture semiconductors. The
holder of the patent on the process brings suit against one of them, but the patent is held
invalid. If the mutuality requirement is observed, he will not be precluded from relitigating
the validity of the patent in a subsequent suit against other producers. Triplett v. Lowell, 297
U.S. 638 (1936), overruled in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (rejecting mutuality on similar facts in order to preclude the patentee from relitigating).
An adverse possessor successfully sues to quiet title to the land he holds. A trespasser can
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both courts2 and commentators.3 The leading case advocating
abandonment of mutuality is Bernhard v. Bank ofAmerica National
Savings & Trust Association 4 (so much so that the abandonment of
the mutuality requirement is often referred to as the Bernhard doctrin:e).5 Though-the case might easily have been brought within one
of the established exceptions to the mutuality doctrine, 6 Justice Trayplead the in rem judgment in a suit brought by the former landowner although he was not a
party to the quiet title action because he too is bound. He is liable to the new owner. Cf.
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) (forfeiture of ship to customs agent precluded
by prior acquittal even though customs agent was not a party to the prior suit).
2. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944,954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962),
qffd as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 951 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl. Trust &
Sav. Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124,
172 A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934); Schwartz v. Public Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 146 N.E.2d 725, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241, 245-47
(1923); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965) (comprehensive state-by-state review in appendix); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel· Limits of the
Bernhard JJoctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Polasky, supra note I; Semmel, supra note l;
35 YALE L.J. 607, 610 (1926).
4. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, Clara Sather authorized Charles
Cook to issue drafts against her Los Angeles bank account. Cook opened an account on her
behalf with the Bank of America in San Dimas. Upon Clara's death, Cook was appointed
executor of her estate and failed to account for the San Dimas monies. The beneficiaries,
including Helen Bernhard, filed objections, but the probate court held that Clara had made a
gift of the funds to Cook.
Following Cook's discharge as executor, Helen Bernhard was appointed administratrix.
Claiming that Clara had never consented to the withdrawal of the San Dimas monies, she
proceeded, in her new capacity, to sue the bank on the theory that it remained indebted to the
estate. 19 Cal. 2d at 809-10, 122 P.2d at 893-94.
On appeal from a judgment favorable to the bank, the California Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Traynor, held that the matter was res judicata. 19 Cal. 2d at 81214, 122 P.2d at 895-96. Bernhard, having litigated and lost the gift question in the probate
court, was estopped to relitigate against the bank even though the bank had not been a party to
the probate proceedings and would not have been bound had the judgment of the probate
court gone the other way.
5. See, e.g., United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (E.D. Wash., D.
Nev. 1962), ajfd as to resjudicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
6. Had Bernhard been successful in her suit against the bank, it has usually been assumed
that the bank would have had an indemnity claim against Cook and that the case could therefore have been decided under the long-established indemnity exception to mutuality. See text
at notes 125-51 infra. Indeed, Bernhard was so explained by a lower court in California. In
re Miller's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 16-17, 230 P.2d 667, 677-78 (1951).
One commentator, however, has noted that the bank's claim against Cook would more
likely have been for unjust enrichment or as subrogee to the rights of the estate. Greenebaum,
In JJejense ofthe JJoctrine ofMutuality ofEstoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1969). The difference is
inconsequential, however, because the "indemnity" exception to mutuality, though commonly
arising in indemnity cases, is invoked to prevent any single party from suffering inconsistent
liability. If Bernhard had not been precluded, then either the bank would have been left
without recourse to Cook, or Cook would have been denied the benefits of his previous successful defense. See text at notes 130-33 infra.
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nor, writing for the California Supreme Court, seized upon Bernhard
to "extirpate the mutuality requirement and put it to the t9rch." 7 In
place of mutuality, he substituted three criteria to be satisfied before
a plea of res judicata precludes relitigation of an issue:
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privily with a party to the prior adjudication?8

When a doctrine of long standing is overturned, courts attempt
either to explain the judicial error to which the old rule can be attributed or to identify those changes in circumstance that have rendered
it obsolete. This rigorous continuity of thought protects against judicial excess and shortsightedness. Indeed, if the courts cannot articulate the basis for the departure from precedent, there is little
reason to believe that the new rule is any sounder than the old.
In the case of mutuality, the analysis has been weak at best. Justice Traynor in Bernhard cursorily dismissed the mutuality doctrine. 9
The cases since Bernhard have done little better, generally being satisfied to cite Bernhard or other more recent cases adopting Bernhard
that, like it, actually fall within the traditional exceptions to the mutuality requirement. 10 Certainly the courts have been moved to
7. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 26. The commentators agree that Traynor intended to abandon mutuality entirely rather than to rest the decision on narrower
grounds. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 290 n.22; Greenebaum, supra note
6, at 5; Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 319; accord, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971).
8. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added).
9. There is no compelling reason . . . for requiring that the party asserting the plea of
res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.
Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from
asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.
19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
Semmel cites this passage with approval, Semmel, supra note I, at 1464, as does Currie, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 283. Their sentiments are echoed by Polasky's plaintive
question:
Accepting the proposition that successive suits involving the same "ultimate issue" should
not lead to differing results and that there should be an end to litigation of an issue, what
reason other than a sterile prating of the requirement of mutuality, prevents the operation
of collateral estoppel as so limited [by the requirement that it not be employed against one
not previously a party]?
Polasky, supra note I, at 246. Judge Friendly noted in Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), that Bentham had attacked the doctrine "as destitute of any semblance of reason" a century earlier. 327 F.2d at 954, quoted with approval in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323
(1971).
10. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 9. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954S6, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870,
873 (6th Cir. 19S9); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 865 (1950); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29, (E.D.
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), qffd as to res judicala and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
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abandon mutuality at least partly by the embarrassment of obviously
inconsistent :findings made possible by more than one trial of the
same issue. 11 But the primary motivation has been a concern for
judicial economy offset by no perceived reason for maintaining mutuality. 12 In the absence of any apparent justification for mutuality,
critics have attributed the requirement to vague notions of equality
and justice, 13 an overzealous devotion to formal symmetry rather
than to substantialjustice, 14 and, as Jeremy Bentham suggested, the
importation to the bench of notions appropriate only to the "gamingtable." 15 At best, the critics concede that the mutuality doctrine
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir. 1964); Tietelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.
2d 601, 604, 375 P.2d 439, 440 (1962); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144-47, 225
N.E.2d 195, 197-98 (1967).
11. "[l]nconsistent results . . . are always a blemish on a judicial system . • . . [I]t is difficult to tolerate a condition where, on relatively the same set of facts, one fact-finder, be it a
court or jury, may hold the driver liable, while the other exonerates him." Schwartz v. Public
Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 74, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730-31, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 955, 962 (1969), quoted in
Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 12. Greenebaum responds that while "[i]nconsistent results
may be embarrassing to a degree, . . . it is much more disastrous to pretend to an infallibility
which does not exist . . . ." Id. at 14. Additionally, he notes that even when mutuality is
abandoned so that future judgments against the party facing multiple opponents can be forced
into conformity, "if the common party [has] been fortunate enough to prevail on the critical
issue in the prior judgment, the law permits him to be subjected to inconsistent results." Id. at
12.
12. Part of the motivation for the abandonment of mutuality may come from the fact that
common parties are more often than not large corporations. It serves, therefore, as sub rosa
strict liability. There are certainly good arguments to be made for holding a railroad or airline strictly liable for injuries to passengers. But a strict liability theory applied so haphazardly has little to commend it. That an accident involves multiple claimants is hardly a sound
reason for shifting from a negligence theory to a strict liability theory, and to do so only in
part, by reducing the common party's chances of success rather than holding him strictly liable
outright, is just as arbitrary.
13. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 284. To Professor Currie, the rule is
"curious," a "classic non sequitur," with some inexplicable appeal to the legal mind. Currie,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 26.
14. The finding of no negligence on the other hand was made after full opportunity to
[plaintiff], on his own election to prove the very matter which he now urges a second time.
Thus, no unfairness results here from estoppel which is not mutual. In reality the argument of [plaintiff] is merely that the application of res judicata in this case makes the law
asymmetrical. But the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the
measure of the fairness of the rules of res judicata.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 325
(1971) (quoting from Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950)).
15. Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger, the
contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule itself is a curious one, the
reason given for it is still more so:-"Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had not
been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary:" a maxim which one would suppose to have
found its way from the gaming-table to the bench. If a party be benefited by one throw
of the dice, he will, if the rules of fair play are observed, be prejudiced by another: but
that the consequence should hold when applied to justice, is not equally clear. This rule
of mutuality is destitute of even that semblence of reason, which there is for the rule
concerning res inter alias acta. There is reason for saying that a man shall not lose his
cause in consequence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he was not a
party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not lose his cause in conse-
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may, on occasion, achieve some desirable results, almost as if by accident.16 Ultimately, the arguments against the mutuality doctrine
amount to little more than a single rhetorical question: Why, other
than the "sterile prating of the requirement of mutuality," 17 should a
p~rty who has had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" 18 be permitted to reopen a question once decided merely because he has
found, or been found by, a new adversary? 19
If the mutuality critics are correct that there is no fundamental
policy embodied in the mutuality requirement, the resources conserved by avoiding repetitious litigation provide ample justification
for its abandonment. But, the mutuality requirement has had defenders.20 In general, they have deplored the fetish for economy
quence of the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party, merely because his adversary was not. It is right enough that a verdict obtained by A against B should not bar the
claim of a third party C; but that it should not be evidence in favour of C against B, seems
the very height of absurdity.
3 J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). This passage from Bentham is cited with approval in
several of the major cases on the question. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America
Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn., 19 Cal 2d. 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). It is equally admired
by the co=entators. See, e.g., Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 284 n.5; Se=el,
supra note l, at 1461 n.19.
Greenebaum, however, in his defense of mutuality, asserts that reliance on Benth;µn is
misplaced. Greenebaum argues, on the basis oflater passages in the same work, that Bentham
supported the mutuality doctrine in the context of collateral estoppel but thought there was no
justification for denying the admission of the judgment as evidence. Greenebaum, supra note
6, at 9 n.35. Of course, in an important sense, it no longer matters what Bentham intended-we are not bound to interpret his works as we would a statute. His argument as
currently understood (or misunderstood) is deemed persuasive and must therefore be met on
those terms, not avoided in the belief that Bentham himself intended something else.
16. There was no virtue in the requirement as such. It was a vague, unanalyzed generalization, conceived, no doubt, in response to felt injustices or anomalies in certain situations, but conceived with a sprawling generality unjustified by those situations. In
operation it produced, almost fortuitously, some results which were sound for quite different reasons. When we cast out the requirement, we must take care not to overturn those
sound results, but to seek out and preserve the sound reasons for them . . . . The fate of
the mutuality rule as applied to collateral estoppel is the same as its fate in other fields of
law: as a principle of justice it has been shown to be a tinkling cymbal, an empty and
fatuous formula productive of more harm than good. But in operation it encompassed
some sound results. Identification of those results and the sound reasons for them is the
task of more discriminating legal analysis.
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 322.
17. Polasky, supra note 1, at 246.
18. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
19. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); REsTATEMEN'.r (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
20. See, e.g., 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1974); Greenebaum,
supra note 6; Moore & Currier, supra note I; von Moschzisker, supra note 1.
Ironically, some of the most eloquent and persuasive arguments on behalf of mutuality are
found in Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3. Although Professor Currie professed to
"have come, like the California Supreme Court, to bury the requirement, not to praise it," id.
at 322, he sought to distinguish a few exceptional cases in which the doctrine had "inadvertently" achieved some desirable results. See the passage quoted in note 16 supra. He ulti-
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that exalts conservation of judicial resources over the judicial system's very ends.21 But the Bernhard doctrine continues to gain adherents, .partly, perhaps, because the defenders of mutuality have
been unable to articulate clearly its central theme. It is the thesis of
this Note that the function of the mutuality requirement is the fair
allocation of litigation risks. Although other commentators have
recognized that the abandonment of mutuality alters litigation risks,
they have not attached enough weight to this fact to conclude that it
warrants the retention of mutuality. Section 88 of the Second Restatement of Judgments, for example, treats the results dictated by
the Bernhard doctrine as presumptively correct, to be rejected if required by the consideration of a number of factors, only one of
which is the distribution of litigation risks. 22 This Note concludes
that mutuality is qualitatively different from the other Restatement
factors. Mutuality is the equitable norm for the distribution of litigation risks. The other factors in section 88, far from justifying departures from mutuality when they are weak or bolstering the claims
of mutuality when they are strong, are considerations that should
lead us to deny preclusive effect even where mutuality is satisfied.
But mutuality remains the sine qua non of an equitable result. In
short, the Bernhard doctrine, in the interest of judicial economy,
clearly retreats from a commitment to substantive justice.
Perhaps more significantly (at least to the judicial economists),
the dollars saved by the Bernhard doctrine are purchased at the price
of a real although previously unnoted degradation of the other product of judicial enterprise-deterrence. If the sanctions which the law
imposes are to effectuate the substantive policies which justify their
invocation, the imposition of the sanction must be seen to follow
from the prohibited conduct. If sanctions are seen as randomly imposed they lose all deterrent effect. The Bernhard doctrine weakens
this crucial link between the theory of liability and the sanction by
mately rejected his own initial reservations about the abandonment of mutuality, see text at
notes 55-63 infra, in a later article, Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, without ever
having realized that one of his initial "narrow'' exceptions to the abrogation of the mutuality
doctrine-the multiple claimant anomaly-subsumed all of the cases in which the mutuality
problem arises. See text at notes 95-103 infra.
21. Admittedly, ... the unadorned public interest ... will be immediately served to
the extent that adjudicated issues will not be subject to relitigation. . . . But the doctrine
of judicial finality is not a catch-penny contrivance to dispose of cases merely for the sake
of disposition . . . . The real issue is whether the method of minimization is a proper one.
Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 308.
For a discussion of the other arguments against the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine, see Appendix A infra.
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF JUDGMENTS§ 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). See note 120
infra.
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interjecting an irrelevant and capricious criterion for decision-the
number of litigants on a given side of a question.
Using ·probability theory as an aid to analysis, this Note will
demonstrate that the mutuality doctrine is designed to allocate trial
risks in a manner consistent with the burden of persuasion in civil
litigation. Thus, the abandonment of mutuality strikes at the heart
of the trial process. Where a single party (hereinafter the "common
party")23 faces multiple opponents on a common question, the abandonment of mutuality can significantly alter the common party's
probability of success. Bernhard thus amounts to little more than an
instruction to the trier of fact to find against the common party simply because he is the common party, a fact entirely unrelated to the
merits of the case.
·-.-Part I of this Note lays the foundation for the conclusions suggested above by setting forth some elementary probabilistic notions
and establishing a measure of trial efficacy. The next part reviews
some of the early suggested limitations on the application of
Bernhard and, by analyzing the mutuality requirement and the
Bernhard doctrine in probabilistic terms, demonstrates that the concerns underlying those initial reservations were not only sound, but
require rejection of Bernhard.
Although the primary purpose of this Note is to expose the
flawed analysis underlying Bernhard, a secondary .purpose is to
demonstrate how probability theory can be applied to situations in
which the mutuality issue arises. Thus, substantial attention is given
in Part III to the application of probability theory to one of the classic exceptions to the mutuality requirement that has been cited as
precedent for the Bernhard doctrine. This analysis establishes that
mutuality is entirely consistent with its traditional exceptions and
that these exceptions can be viewed as precedent for Bernhard only
when analyzed with the same misplaced emphasis on outcome,
rather than risk allocation, that initially led to the Bernhard doctrine.
Finally, an examination of a recent decision purporting to adopt
Bernhard illustrates how analysis without explicit attention to risk
allocation persistently generates inappropriate rules of preclusion in
multiple litigation.
23. This follows terminology suggested by Greenebaum, supra note 6.
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ELEMENTARY PROBABILITY THEORY AND A MEASURE OF
TRIAL EFFICACY

A. Probability Theory and the Burden of Persuasion in Civil
Litigation
This section will introduce some elementary notions of
probability theory that relate to fact determination in civil litigation.
These notions, together with a measure of trial efficacy that will be
derived from them, will subsequently provide a basis upon which to
evaluate the effects of the mutuality requirement and of the
Bernhard doctrine on trial risks and the burden of persuasion in civil
litigation.
Probability theory provides a method by which uncertainty can
be quantified. It is thereby possible to devise a rational strategy for
minimizing total costs over the long term that takes into account the
absence of complete knowledge. 24 Additionally, the quantification
of uncertainty makes it possible to manipulate information algebraically and to extract relationships which are not readily apparent but
which are nevertheless implicit in that information.25
The only assumption that must be made in order to establish the
utility of probability theory is that past experience is the best available predictor of future experience.26 Suppose, for example, that B
represents the class of cases in which the lord of the manor was slain
and the identity of the murderer is known. The subclass of those
cases in which the butler was determined with absolute certainty to
have done it is represented by A. If there are m cases in class B and
n cases in class A, then the ratio of n/m represents the probability
that a case will be in A given the knowledge that the case is in B,
abbreviated P(AIB). Since n cannot exceed m, the ratio, expressed
in decimal terms, will always be a number between O and 1. In the
hypothetical, P(AIB) represents the probability that the slayer of the
lord would be determined to be the butler.27
24. For a leading work on decision analysis, see H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS-INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1970).
25. See generally Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
26. This is a form of what statisticians call "statistical inference." See generally E. KANE,
EcONOMIC STATISTICS AND ECONOMETRICS 98-108 (1968).
27. The hypothetical is extremely simple. It assumes the absence of a trend over time and
of feedback; that is, it ignores the possibility that butlers, knowing that they are prime suspects,
will be less likely to murder masters. That would be additional evidence for the trier of fact
that would modify the probability. The hypothetical, however, assumes that literally only one
relevant fact is known: in n of the m murders previously committed, the butler did it.
The hypothetical also assumes an "extra-judicial" mode of determination that would make
it possible to identify with certainty the culprit in prior master murder cases. In real life, of
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Now, assuming that past experience is the best available predictor of future experience in such cases, a decision-making strategy can
be developed based on P(AIB). When confronted with another class
of lord-of-the-manor slayings, Bi, about which membership in Ai,
the subclass of cases where the butler did it, is unknown, the best
guess about the number of cases in which the butler would be determined to have committed the crime is the number (or the nearest
whole number thereto) that bears the same ratio to the total number
of elements of B 1 as n does to m, the total number of elements of B.
It is the best guess because that relationship between the incidence of
membership in B and the incidence of membership in A has always
been the case in the past. In reality the ratio will often not be the
same. Based on past experience, however, it is the best guess.
If the object when deciding new lord-of-the-manor cases is to
minimize the total number of errors,28 and all that is known are
P(AIB) and the fact that the lord was slain, then applying past experience and the best-guess rule to a murder about which membership
in A is unknown, we should guess that the new case is in A, and thus
that the butler did it, when the probability of A given B exceeds .5.
When the probability of A is less than .5, the best guess is that the
butler did not do it. When P(AIB) = .5, then the fact that the case is
in class B does not tell us anything about whether it is also in class A,
and there is no best guess.
Under some circumstances, after a guess has been made, the actual outcome of a previously uncertain event will become known.
This process, in tum, adds to our experience and may alter the
probability with respect to some as yet undetermined matter. However, the fact that a given matter is susceptible to determination
while another is not has no bearing on the optimal guessing strategy
while the matter remains uncertain. The best guess is still that
which brings to bear our past experience.
This discussion of rational decision-making is not meant to suggest that determining the best guess is not extremely difficult and
complex. Unlike those used in the lord-of-the-manor hypothetical,
most probabilities cannot be determined merely by counting known
outcomes of past events, because, for example, membership in B is
itself uncertain or is only one of a myriad of facts that are known.
course, this function is played by the prior experience of the trier of fact with evidence of the
kind introduced at trial. The definition of an impartial trier of fact requires that the juror not
have had the sort of direct experience with the factual matters at issue that is the source of
expectations about the correlation between events and evidence of those events.
28. Of course, the goal of rational decision-making may not always be solely to minimize
the total number of errors. See text at note 29 i,!fra.
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Rather, a single value for the probability is often no more than a
subjective estimate. The principle behind the best-guess rule remains the same, however, and for purposes of later analysis, it is the
principle that is important. No matter how flawed the analysis of the
probabilities may be, if the goal is to minimize the number of errors
(or the likelihood of error), clearly the most rational course in a single case is to pick the outcome deemed most likely to be correct.
The problem of decision making is complicated, however, by the
fact that we are not always attempting to minimize the total number
of errors. An alternative strategy for rational decision making is required where, for example, the decision maker considers a verdict
for one party more undesirable than a verdict for the other party.
The analysis in such cases is facilitated by "weighting" all possible
outcomes according to their respective costs.29 Consider, for example, the burden of persuasion in criminal cases. An erroneous conviction in such cases is deemed more undesirable than an erroneous
acquittal. Because we want to minimize the cost of decisions, that is
to minimize the "expected average disutility," and not merely to reduce the number of errors, the criminal burden of persuasion does
not reflect an error-minimizing strategy. 30
In contrast, the burden of persuasion in civil litigation embodies
a strategy designed to minimize the number of erroneous verdicts.
This is entirely consistent with the criminal burden of persuasion.
Whether the relief sought is compensatory or equitable, civil litigation is essentially a matter ofloss shifting. A loss has been or will be
incurred; the question is simply who should bear it. Absent some
peculiar and cognizable virtue inhering in one of the parties, there is
no reason to prefer an error in one direction over an error in the
other. Consequently, the preponderance-of-the-evidence test instructs the factfinder to follow the error-minimizing strategy to
choose the verdict most likely to be the truth. 31 When there is no
29. See generally Kaplan, .Decision Theory and the Facrfinding Process, 20 STAN, L. Rev.
1065, 1073-77 (1968); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 15 MICH, L. REV. 1021, 1034-41 (1977).
30. See generally Ball, The Momeni of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961); McBaine, Burden ofProo.ft .Degrees ofBelief, 32 CALIF. L. REV.
242 (1944); Simon & Mahan, (}uant!fying Burdens ofProof, 5 LAW & SocY. Rev. 319 (1971);
Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & SocY. REV. 335 (1971).
31. The correctness of this conclusion can be demonstrated with the aid of the "disutility
matrix" illustrated below. (While customarily called a ''utility matrix" in decision theory, the
term "disutility'' is used here since some disutility is associated with the nonzero cells. It is
also often referred to as a "regret" matrix. See Lempert, supra note 29, at 1032 & n.36.)
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best guess, i.e., when the probability of a verdict in either direction is
.5, we have a per se rule that the verdict is to be rendered on behalf
of the defendant. 32 The burden of persuasion is thus not merely a
rule of convenience to be discarded or modified lightly. It embodies
ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS

Plaintiff should
prevail
du

for plaintiff

Defendant should
prevail
d12

Verdict
for defendant
The entries represent the disutility associated with each verdict given the possible actual
state of affairs. To calculate the "expected average disutility" associated with a particular
decision, we define p 1 as the probability that the actual state of affairs dictates a verdict for
plaintiff and p2 as the probability that a verdict for defendant is required. Then e 1 and ei, the
expected average disutility of a verdict for plaintiff and of a verdict for defendant, respectively,
can be defined by the following equations:
e1 = d11P1 + d12P2
ez = d21P1 + d22P2
If it is assumed that no disutility is associated with a correct verdict and that the two possible erroneous verdicts are equally undesirable, then d 11 = d 22 = 0 and d 12 = d21 = I. (The
value I is chosen for the disutility of an erroneous verdict for ease of calculation and without
loss of generality since the relative value of disutility, not the absolute value, is all that is
important.) The disutility matrix under this assumption is:

C~
Evaluating the expected average disutility for this matrix yields
e1 = Op1 + I P2 = P2
e2 = lp1 + Op2 = Pt
The expected average disutility is minimized by choosing the verdict with the lowest expected average disutility. Since the only possibilities for the actual state of affairs are that
plaintiff should prevail (p 1) or that defendant should prevail (Pi), PI+ p 2 = I. Consequently,
e 1 will be less than Ci, dictating a verdict for plaintiff, only when p 1 is greater than p2, i.e.,
when PI is greater than .5. The result is intuitively obvious. When the cost of an error in one
direction is equal to the cost of an error in the other direction and a correct decision is costless,
the strategy for minimizine total cost is to pick the outcome most likely to be correct, that is, to
mini mire the total number of errors. This is reflected in civil litigation by the requirement of a
verdict for plaintiff when he has met the burden of persuasion, or in other words, when he has
convinced the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that he is correct. See McBaine;
Simon & Mahan; Winter, supra note 30.
At the same time, a strategy designed to minimize the total number of errors reveals something about the values of d: the expected average disutilities are equal when the probability
that either party should prevail is .5. If nothing else were known about the values of d, this
strategy would reveal that d 11 + dI 2 = d 21 + d 22• Ifit is assumed that there is no disutility
associated with a correct verdict so that d 1I = d22 = O, then the strategy implies that an erroneous verdict on behalf of one party is no more or less desirable than an erroneous judgment on
behalf of the other, i.e., that d12 = d 22•
For an application of the disutility matrix to a criminal trial, where dI 2 ,j, d 21 , see Lempert,
supra note 29, at 1038. The so-called error minimizing strategy is merely a special case of the
more general program of minimizing costs in which the point of decision is a probability of .5.
32. It is important not to overestimate the strength of the claim that civil litigation func-
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the fundamental assumption of civil litigation that, without regard to
the merits, neither party is the more deserving of a favorable judgment.
The error minimizing strategy illustrates the utility of probability
theory in relating knowledge about the true state of affairs and costs
in a manner that permits rational decision-making in civil litigation
in the face of uncertainty. Probability theory is also useful in relating various pieces of information whose relationship is not readily
apparent. This is accomplished with the aid of the calculus of
probabilities, a set of rules that describes how unknown probabilities
can be calculated from known probabilities. The most useful of
these rules for present purposes are the rule for calculating compound probabilities for independent events and Bayes' Theorem.
Events are independent if the outcome of one trial does not affect
the probability of a given outcome in a succeeding trial. The classic
example is dice-throwing, where the outcome of one roll does not
affect the outcome of succeeding rolls. The rule for calculating the
probability of two independent events, A and B, both occurring,
given the occurrence of a third event, C, is
disutility matrix. Arguably, one of the purposes of the jury system is to obtain community
opinion on the relative disutilities, which can be expected to equal D only infrequently. But
we instruct juries in terms that reflect disutility matrix D. For example, we generally do not
instruct juries that they are permitted to place their own valuation on the possible outcomes.
Nor do we inform them of the existence of insurance. This policy is exquisitely expressed in
criminal litigation when we refuse to instruct juries about the possibility of jury nullification.
Moreover, the disutility should be equal to D for the abstract case. If we are rational
decision-makers, and.if there is no reason to prefer plaintiffs over defendants or vice versa as a
general matter, then, without knowing anything else about the individual case other than that
it is a civil case, the disutility matrix should equal D.
Another way to state the preceding argument is that, to the extent we do not want to function with a disutility matrix D, the task of assigning values to the possible outcomes belongs to
a jury studiously instructed that it is bound not to do so. Because the rule of law called the
Bemhard doctrine assigns those values in a way which, from the perspective of juries as a
whole, is chaotic and irrational, it is inconsistent with the burden of persuasion in the operational sense.
There is still another qualification to the assertion that the burden of persuasion is the
embodiment of disutility matrix D. This Note carefully avoids the use of the term burden of
proof in order to maintain the distinction between the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion. But verdicts are probably directed in a fashion that cannot be fully explained by
the burden of persuasion. That is, verdicts will be directed because a party has failed to meet
his or her burden of production even though a reasonable juror could find for that party on the
existing evidence and a rational view of the likelihood of historical events in light of that
evidence. In this way, the verdict is employed not merely to shift losses on the basis of fmdings of historical fact, but also to secure the sort of evidence on which we want to base verdicts.
That the burden of proof has this dual aspect in no way alters the strength of the claims made
in this Note with respect to the burden of persuasion. Further, the Bemhard doctrine has no
function with respect to the burden of production.
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P(A & BIC)

= P(AIC)

EQUATION

625

• P(BIC)

1

Bayes' Theorem provides a method for determining how new information alters existing probabilities. Assume that I is the initial
known state of affairs, E is some piece of evidence or additional
knowledge, and S is the event in whose occurrence or nonoccurrence
we are interested. If P(E & 11S) = P<EIS) • PCTIS) and P(S & IIE) =
P(SIE) • P(IIE), that is, if I is independent of E and of S, then it
follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

= P(EIS) • P{SID

P(SIE)

P(EII)

EQUATION

2 33

These two rules for deriving unknown probabilities from known
probabilities will be used in the next subsection to derive a measure
for the efficacy of the trial process. Ultimately, this standard will be
applied to civil litigation under Bernhard and under the mutuality
doctrine to support the conclusion that the Bernhard doctrine is unsound.
B. A Measure of Trial Efficacy

Thus far this Note has shown that the error minimizing strategy
is basic to the fundamental values underlying civil litigation. This
subsection will demonstrate that in light of that strategy the most
rational disposition of a given case is the one that would be in accord
with the majority view if the case were tried indefinitely. It will also
show that the standard of accordance with the majority also provides
a useful measure of trial efficacy. Constructing such a measure is
•

33. According to Bayes' Theorem, P(AIB)
Thus P(SIE) = P(E!S) • P(S)
'
P(E)
Therefore:

=

P(BIA) • P(A)
P(B)

Since I is independent of S and E, P(l!S) = P(IIE).

P(SIE)

=

P(E!S) • P(l!S) • P(S)
P(l!E) • P(E)

P(E!S) •

P(IIS) • P(S)
P(I)

P(IIE) • P(E)
P(I)
P(EIS) • P(SII)
P(EII)
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critical, because a trial is a striking example of a situation in which
the accuracy of the guess or outcome cannot be determined after the
fact.
Professor Brainerd Currie begins his analysis of the Bernhard
doctrine by stating an obvious principle:
·
We cannot know in terms of absolute truth whether the actor committed the wrong or not. Courts can only do their best to determine the
truth on the basis of the evidence; and the first lesson one must learn
on the subject of res judicata is that judicial fmdings must not be confused with absolute truth. 34

Professor Currie's simple lesson, by its very modesty, obscures a subtle but critical distinction. The problem for purposes of finality is
not human error but human inconsistency. A case might be litigated and relitigated indefinitely, always with the same result, without providing any assurance that the trier of fact has determined the
"truth." In such a world, the obvious strategy would be to give
every judgment the broadest possible preclusive effect because in future litigation every issue will, by hypothesis, be decided the same
way. Judicial decisions, however, are not perfectly reproducible.
Given that successive trials of the same issue are unlikely to yield the
same result indefinitely, the central question of collateral estoppel
becomes how much weight to give a single determination when a
retrial may yield a different verdict neither more nor less likely to be
"true" than the first. 35
To state the matter another way, for purposes of finality there are
two uncertainties inherent in the trial system. One is the uncertainty
about absolute truth, which presumably cannot be determined in a
subsequent trial with any greater certainty than that which the initial
trial affords. The other uncertainty is whether a given verdict is
even in accordance with what would be the majority outcome if the
case were tried a very large number of times, ie., uncertainty
whether a given verdict is our collective best guess.
Unlike the truth about whether the actor committed the wrong, it
is always possible to improve our knowledge about whether a given
trial outcome is our collective best guess merely by successively retrying the case. Each outcome provides additional evidence of what
the majority viewpoint would be if the case were tried an indefinite
34. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15.
35. Some verdicts may be more suspicious than others because of procedural defects in the
conduct ofthe trial. Flaws in the process aside, however, every verdict is as worthy of respect
as another. To argue otherwise is to suppose that there is some method, apart from litigation
itself, with at least a marginally greater likelihood of arriving at the truth. If such a method
exists, one wonders why it does not co=end itself to the courts and the legislatures as a
superior method of resolving disputes.
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number of times. The greater the number of trials, the less likely it
is that the relative frequencies of verdicts for the plaintiff and of verdicts for the defendant actually obtained will vary significantly from
the ultimate distribution, and the greater will be the accuracy of our
best guess.
To illustrate the effect of subsequent trials upon our knowledge
about the relative frequencies of verdicts, and thus upon our best
guess, assume that, a priori, cases in which a verdict for plaintiff
would be rendered 50% of the time are as prevalent as cases in which
a verdict for plaintiff would be rendered 75% of the time, 90% of the
time, or any other percentage of the time. In other words, assume
that all relative frequencies of verdicts are equally likely. 36 When
the outcome of a single trial is known, however, it provides information that indicates that a relatively frequency above 50% on behalf of
the winning party is more likely to be the actual frequency than is a
36. Relative frequency is a continuous variable from O to l, and, as such, there are an
infinite number of relative frequency values. If a finite value of probability were associated
with each of the infinite number of values of relative frequency between O and 1, the total
probability would be infinite. But in any probability function the total probability must be
finite, so that the function can be normalized. Thus, a probability cannot be stated for every
relative frequency value.
There is, however, a finite probability density for each value of relative frequency which
can be used to determine the finite probability of a relative frequency falling within a given
interval. That is, there is a finite probability that the relative frequency will fall within the
interval .5 to I (or any other interval), but there is only a probability density associated with
each of the relative frequencies within that interval. The probability for a given range of
relative frequencies is found by integrating probability density over the relative frequencies in
the interval.
For example, the probability of S (the state of affairs in which a verdict for one party,
X, is in the majority [in the interval .5 to I]), given only I (the initial state of affairs in
which all relative frequencies of verdicts are equally likely), is determined as follows:

P(S11)

=

!s
lo

:(p)dp
d(p)dp

//odp
lo~dp
D•pl.~

D•pl~
= .5
where p is the relative frequency and d(p) is the probability aensit1,. (a constan~ D, since,
·ven I, all relative frequencies are equally likely). In o~e~ ~ords, 1t ;l e9-ually likely that a
~rdict for Xis in the majority as it is likely that the verdict 1S m the mmo?ty. (Hereafter, the
al
f o will be set equal to 1 for the sake of convenience and because with D equal to 1, the
;ro~:~ility density functions are normalized-the total probability is equal to 1.)
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frequency below 50%, thus changing the probability of various relative frequencies of verdicts for the plaintiff.37 The magnitude of this
change can be calculated by the use of Bayes' Theorem.
In applying Bayes' Theorem, we will use the following notation:
let p be the probability that a given verdict will occur in a particular
case; let d(p) be the probability density that a case with a given
probability, p, will occur; let S be the state of affairs in which a verdict for one party, say X, is in the hypothetical majority and thus is
the best guess; let I be the initial state of affairs in which all relative
frequencies of a verdict for X are equally likely; and let E represent
a single verdict for X. Bayes' Theorem can now be used to calculate
the change from P(SII) (the probability that a verdict for X is the
best guess, given the initial assumption about the relative frequencies
of such verdicts) to P(SIE) (the probability that a verdict for Xis the
best guess given the new information that the first trial resulted in
such a verdict).
The initial component in Bayes' Theorem, P(SII), is equal to .5,
since one half of the "equally likely" frequency distribution of verdicts for X satisfies the condition that Xis the majority verdict.38
This value for P(SII) is illustrated in Graph A by the fact that the
region to the right of p = .5 is equal to one-half of the total area.
D

d(p) .SD

0

.25

.5

p
GRAPH A

Graph A is useful for demonstrating the values for the remaining
components of the Bayesian equation. The shaded area represents
37. Of course, any change in the probability of relative frequencies of verdicts for the
plaintiff results in a corresponding change in the probability of relative frequencies of verdicts
for the defendant.
38. See example in note 36 supra.
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the portion of all judgments for each frequency distribution that results in a verdict for X. Thus, by way of example, where p = .25,
25% of the verdicts are for X, and the height of the curve is onefourth the height of the initial distribution; where p = .5, 50% are for
X, and the height of the curve is one half the height of the initial
distribution. Since under the initial assumption each value of p is
equally likely, the shaded region equals one half the total area. Thus
P(EII)-the probability of a verdict for X given I-is equal to .5.39
The state of affairs defined as S is represented by the region of
Graph A where p is greater than .5, that is, where a verdict for Xis
in the majority. Seventy-five percent of this region is shaded, indicating that P(EIS) = .75.40 On the basis of the values for P(SII),

11

39.

P(Ell) == 0 d(p)dp
/4~p

== p2

2

I

l

0

== .5

40.

I

p2 I
2
==

.5

p1.1
.375

== .75
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P(Ell), and P(EIS), Bayes' Theorem indicates that P(SIE) = .75,41 i.e.,
that the probability that a verdict for Xis in the majority given such
a verdict in the first case is .75. Graphically, P(SIE) is represented by
the ratio of the shaded area in Graph A that is to the right of p = .5
to the total shaded area.
Since this analysis is unaffected by whether X is the plaintiff or
the defendant, it can be stated generally that, given the assumption
that, a priori, all relative frequencies are equally likely, the
probability that the outcome of a single trial will be in accordance
with the majority view is .75. If each claim is tried once and only
once, judicial determinations will be erroneous 25% of the time in
the sense that they will not conform to our collective best guess
about the truth.
More information about the actual relative frequency of verdicts
can be obtained, and thus the error rate can be reduced, if each claim
is tried more than once. Graph B represents the situation after two
trials each producing a verdict for X.

d(p)

0

.5

p
GRAPH

B

The curve defining the upper boundary of the shaded area is p2, i.e. ,
the compound probability density of two successive trials resulting in
a verdict for X when the probability density of such a verdict in a
single trial is p and the two trials are independent.42 The
41. Application of Equation 2 (text at note 33 supra) results in

P(SIE)

=

P(EIS) • P(S11)
P(EII)
.75 X .5
.5

= .75
42. P(E & Ell) = P(EII) • P(EII) (Equation 1). When working with probability densities,
to determine compound probabilities the densities are first multiplied and then integrated over
the relevant interval. Thus, P(E & Ell) = /21 p • pdp.
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probability that the decision in the two cases is in accord with the
majority view is .875,43 the ratio of the shaded area that is to the
right of p = .5 to the total shaded area. If, on the other hand, the
two trials resulted in one verdict for X and one for the other party,
the curve would be 2p(l-p), as in Graph C. In that situation, the
outcome of the two trials tells us nothing more about the majority
Where the trials are civil trials, rather than coin-flips, independence means that the outcome of one trial does not influence the outcome of any subsequent trial. However, the litigants, particularly the common party, may learn from preceding trials. To the extent that the
common party can alter the probability in his favor, the results derived here overstate the
effect of the Bernhard doctrine. This Note thus assumes that the relative magnitude of any
change in favor of the common party is small. This cannot be proved but seems intuitively
clear.
43.

P(Sfl)
P(E & Efl)

= .5

(note 36 supra)

= Jc/ p 2dp

(note 42 supra)

P(E & EfS)

~1-~

=-.5-

.875

=3x.5
P(SfE & E)

P(E & EfS) • P(Sfl)
P(E & Efl)

~
3 • .5

X.5

l

3

= .875

(Equation l)·
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outcome because one half of the shaded area is to the right of .5 and
one half is to the left.44

d(p)

.5

0

p
GRAPH

C

As the case is tried more and more times, the curve begins to form a
peak at some point and to grow narrower, and more of the total area
44.

-

P(E & Ell)

=

11 p(l-p)dp
0

=_.e:_.£:_11
2
3
o
I

=6

P(E &

EIS)

!s~(l-p)dp
!sldp

P(S11)

P(SIE & E)

= .5
1
(i X .5

= ---r6
=.5
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under the curve concentrates around the peak.45 As this occurs, the
shaded portion under the curve inevitably becomes concentrated in
one half of the graph or the other. Consequently, we can more certainly identify the majority view, and errors become less likely.
The distinction between uncertainty about the truth and uncertainty whether a given verdict is in accordance with the majority outcome must be borne in mind. Professor Currie's maxim reminds us
that judicial fmality is not based on the conviction that we have
found the truth with certainty.46 The assumption that the court has
done its best to determine the truth does not, however, mean that
nothing more can be done, for a subsequent trial does add to our
knowledge. Thus far, truth and the best guess have been treated as
unrelated. If, however, we believe that our subjective best guess
bears any consistent relationship to the truth-the only justification
for spending money and time on a trial-then each trial, by adding
to our knowledge of the best guess, adds to our knowledge of the
truth.47
That each trial adds to our knowledge about the best guess does
not mean it is reasonable to try a case indefmitely. Knowledge is
expensive, and a point exists beyond which further expenditures are
not justified. As a general matter this Note agrees that the marginal
return in reduced error from a second trial is not justified in light of
the marginal cost.48 That this general rule is not invariably correct
will be shown subsequently.49 What is most critical at this point is
45. The actual relative frequency for the case can thus be fixed with a high degree of
confidence within an increasingly narrow interval as the number of trials increases.
46. See text at note 34 supra.
47. This Note assumes that, while we cannot know the truth with certainty, we are nevertheless concerned with finding the truth. Insofar as we are capable of ascertaining the truth,
that end is furthered by choosing as the basis of decision the view of historical fact that we
deem most likely to be the case.
A more cynical view is that only the popular perception that the trial system finds the truth
to the extent possible and people's consequent belief that their actions will have predictable
judicial consequences are important. The measure of trial efficacy proposed here is compatible with either view because it takes as its standard the belief that would be held by the majority of juries if the case were tried an indefinite number of times-that is, it takes as its standard
the popular conception of the truth.
48. While, for example, in the sitµation posited earlier in this discussion, see notes 40-43
supra and accompanying text, the first trial substantially increases the accuracy of our best
guess from 50% to approximately 75%, a 50% improvement, two trials, each resulting in a
verdict for the same party, only increase the accuracy of our best guess from .75 to .875, an
increase of .125, or a 17% improvement.
49. Given the constraints of due process, which prevents preclusion of nonparties, we must
either conduct additional trials in "mutuality" situations or suffer greater-error than that which
is ordinarily entailed by a single trial of a single claim. Thus successive trials are conducted in
the special case of multiple claims out of a need to maintain the usual error rate, not in an
attempt to achieve a greater accuracy. See generally text at notes 100-03 i'!fra.
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that, while the standard of truth provides no measurable rate of error
because we cannot in principle know which verdict the truth supports, the standard of accordance with the majority does provide a
measurable rate of error because we can, in theory, "know" the majority view to any arbitrary degree of certainty. It is in this sense,
then, that the standard of accordance with the majority provides a
measure of trial efficacy with which to evaluate Bernhard and the
mutuality doctrine.
II. THE MEANING

OF THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

A.

Traditional Criticism of the Bernhard Doctrine

A brief review of some of the early criticism of Bernhard provides a foundation for the application of the principles developed in
the preceding section to the mutuality requirement and the Bernhard
doctrine. Aside from the fundamental argument that a requirement
of mutuality is necessary to achieve the equitable distribution of litigation risks, other arguments against its abandonment have been advanced:
(1) It is argued that the abandonment of mutuality is not necessary in order to prevent multiple harassment, one of the traditional
objects of collateral estoppel generally.so
(2) The abandonment of mutuality is said to be inherently inconsistent with the principles of in personam jurisdiction.s 1
(3) It is claimed that the abandonment of mutuality may, perversely, increase litigation even though the number of trials is decreased.s2
(4) Finally, it is said that the abandonment of mutuality inequitably burdens the common party's litigation resources and prevents
him from allocating those resources rationally and efficiently.s3
While these arguments are not without merit, they are not compelling.54 Thus, a convincing case against the abandonment of mutuality must be based primarily on the claim that abandonment
unjustifiably alters the distribution of litigation risks among the parties involved.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

infta.

Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 308.
Id. at 301, 310.
Polasky, supra note 1, at 220.
Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 15.
The arguments against the abandonment of mutuality are criticized in Appendix A
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Ironically, the most telling criticism of the abandonment of mutuality has been raised by Professor Brainerd Currie, perhaps the
most vigorous champion ofBernhard. The abandonment of mutuality leads to what Currie dubbed the "multiple-claimant anomaly." 55
In his now famous example, a train derailment leaves fifty passengers injured:
[T]wenty-five passengers, in twenty-five separate actions, all fail to establish negligence on the part of the railroad. Then passenger No. 26
wins his action. Are we to understand that the remaining twenty-four
passengers can plead the judgment in case of No. 26 as conclusively
establishing that the railroad was guilty of negligence, while the railroad can make no reference to the first twenty-five cases which it won?
There is only one possible answer to this question: no such absurdity would be tolerated for a moment. The indefensibility of such a
result seems obvious.5 6
In forcefully rejecting the arguments of some commentators in sup-

port of the application of Bernhard in the train hypothetical,57 Cur55. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 285.
56. Id. at 286.
The elementary requirements of due process, of course, prevent the railroad from pleading
any favorable judgment against a subsequent plaintiff who was not a party or in privity with a
party to the action in which the judgment was rendered. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940).
57. See, e.g., Comment, Privily and Mutuality in the .Doctrine ofRes Judicata, 35 YALE L.J.
607, 612 (1926) (citations omitted):
It may be argued that this unduly oppresses the defendant, since in each suit he must
defeno to the utmost and always has everything to lose and relatively little to gain.
Should he win the first suit, however, the benefit of the experience will enable hiIIi the .
more readily to defend the others, and should he lose, it wilfbe only after a fair OPJ?Ortunity to defend, and he ought not to complain ifhe is bound by a judgment against rum on
the merits. If [there is] no injustice in forcing a defendant to figlit [fifty] plaintiffs at once,
with all staked upon the issue, there would seem to be none in forcing a party to stake all
upon one fair liti~ation where he has only a single opponent. In addition, there is a
considerable public advantage in the reduction of litigation.
Currie's response to this argument is a sardonic jewel:
Does such an argument require an answer? It may, indeed, be argued that such a rule
"unduly oppresses" the defendant. He is required to defend every suit to the utmost,
risking everything against the chance of winning as to a single claim. And how is he to be
compensated for the imposition of this perilous disaavantage? Forsooth, by the
experience he gains if he wins the first suit-an experience which is his under the established rule whether he wins or loses; an experience which is valueless to him ifhe loses the
first suit; an experience which is offset, to say the least, by the "experience" which accrues
to the remaining [forty-nine] plaintiffs as they hold back, without risk, and make notes
while the case is defended "to the utmost"; an experience which, at best, is scant J>rotection against the probability that, sooner or later, some jury in one of the remaining [fortynine] cases will exercise its prerogative to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, no matter how ably experienced counsel conducts the defense. The assurance that, if the defendant loses, it will be only after a fair opportunity to defend, has a
seductive sound; the author has conveniently ignored the fact that the defendant had not
one but . . . twenty-six "fair opportunities to defend," in only one of which he failed.
Can it still be said that he ought not to complain if the twenty-five successful outcomes are
ignored, and the one aberrational verdict is elevated to the status of objective truth?
The argument ends lamely on the plaintive note that ''there is a considerable public
advantage in the reduction of litigation." Why, so there is, and no doubt it would be to
the public advantage if there were no liti&ation at all; but the question is, at what point
does the public interest in reducing litigation yield to the interest in fair procedure?
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rie makes two points important both to his initial attempt to limit
Bernhard and to his later reversal of that position. The first point is
that where the common party is the defendant, as in the train hypothetical, the plaintiffs possess the initiative-a "priceless strategic advantage"-and may bring suit in a forum inconvenient to the
defendant or in one which makes it possible to take advantage of a
case with factors exciting sympathy for the plaintiff. 58 His second
observation strikes directly at the heart of Bernhard, a fact that Currie apparently does not perceive:
If we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the railroad as res
judicata when it is the last of a series, all of which except the last were
favorable to the railroad, it must follow that we should also be unwilling to treat an adverse judgment as res judicata even though it was
rendered in the first action brought, and is the only one of record. Our
aversion to the twenty-sixth judgment as a conclusive adjudication
stems largely from the feeling that such a judgment in such a series
must be an aberration, but we have no warrant for assuming that the
aberrationaljudgment will not come as thefirst in the series. Indeed on
the basis of the considerations [with respect to the plaintiffs possession
of the initiative], the judgment first rendered will be the one least likely
to represent an unprejudiced finding after a full and fair hearing.59

Although Currie is loathe to preclude the defendant under such
circumstances, he is convinced that "[t]he basic doctrine of the
Bernhard case is sound"60 and that "[t]here is no virtue in the mutuality requirement as such."61 He attempts, therefore, to distinguish
Bernhard from his train hypothetical by subjecting the Bernhard
doctrine to two narrow exceptions. First, the plea of collateral estoppel should not be allowed where the plea would create an anomaly such as would occur in the railroad hypothetical, i.e., ''where the
party against whom the plea is assertedfaces more than two successive
actions. " 62 Second, since the principle of collateral estoppel assumes "that the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 287.
58. Currie, 9 STAN, L. REV. 281, supra note 3, at 288.
59. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). Although it is not possible to determine when a particular judgment is an aberration, Currie in effect suggests it is possible to tell when it is not, since
he claimed there is no risk of the multiple claimant anomaly when there are only two claimants. See text at note 62 infra. Apparently he believed that a result that is not in the minority of the cases actually tried cannot be anomalous. Under this reasoning, if there are only
two trials, no single outcome can be anomalous, there is no risk of giving an amomalous outcome preclusive effect, and there is no reason to withhold the full force of the Bernhard doctrine. But this is just a manifestation of Currie's confusion between risk and outcome, for the
presence or absence of a third claim cannot affect the risks that the common party must bear in
the first two suits.
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
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full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively . . the plea
should not be allowed, where, by. . . reason ofhisformer adversary's
possession of the initiative, he has not had such an opportunity."63
Irritated by Currie's assertion that courts would not or could not
weigh fair and full opportunity to litigate case by case and unimpressed by Currie's analysis, 64 courts have generally rejected Currie's
suggested limitations on the application of Bernhard.65 In United
States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 66 for example, a case not unlike Currie's railroad hypothetical, the airline, having litigated and lost the
issue of negligence, was estopped to relitigate even though the plaintiffs could not have been bound by the prior judgment; there was a
risk of the multiple-claimant anomaly in that the airline potentially
faced more than two successive actions; and the airline, as the defendant, had not enjoyed the initiative in the prior suit.67
If, as will be shown later,68 Currie's initial error was his failure to
realize that the implications of his limitations to Bernhard required
complete rejection of the doctrine, that error was compounded by his
subsequent abandonment of these two limitations in Civil Procedure:
The Tempest Brews.69 In abandoning his offensive/defensive distinction,70 Currie cited United Airlines as an example of a case
where, despite the defensive posture of the common party, the court
properly concluded that the defendant had enjoyed an impeccably
full and fair opportunity to make its defense. 71 Abandonment of the
offensive/defensive distinction on the ground that courts have
63. Id. (emphasis added). This exception is co=only referred to as the offensive/defensive distinction, since it provides that Bernhard should not be applied when a nonco=on party seeks to use a prior judgment offensively.
64. As Currie explains it, the difficulty in the railroad case is that the judgment which is
given preclusive effect is the one we have the most reason to suspect. If that is the thrust of his
concern, his solution-that we apply Bernhard only when there are no more than two
claims-is unresponsive to the problem. See text at note 59 supra. The number of outstanding claims has no logical relation to the degree of confidence to be accorded the most recent
judgment.
65. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
934 (1964).
' 66. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), qffd as to res judicata and mutuality sub
nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
· 67. See Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 34. In addition, the case had been
decided by a jury, a factor which has been relied on to prevent preclusion. See also Bemer v.
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 539-41 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 983 (1966).
68. See text at notes 75-76 infra.
69. 53 CALIF. L. RE.v. 25, supra note 3.
70. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
71. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, supra note 3, at 36.
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proved capable of evaluating whether the common party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate is not, however, inconsistent with
Currie's initial rationale for this exception to Bernhard. More surprising w~s Currie's .abandonment of the exception on behalf of a
common party facing more than two opponents. Although as originally stated this constraint appeared to relate to the possibility that
the outcome rather than the procedure of the initial trial might be
unrepresentative, Currie subsequently treated the exception as nothing more than another "rule of thumb" designed, like the offensive/defensive distinction, to prevent a judgment based on less than
a full and fair opportunity to litigate from being given preclusive
effect.7 a
Currie's final position with respect to collateral estoppel, then,
embraces Bernhard with only one qualification, one which he read
as implicit in the Bernhard decision: that it should not be applied to
work injustice.73 In other words, preclusive effect should be denied
only where the common party against whom the prior judgment is
asserted did not have a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issue. 74
72. [F]or essentially the same reasons [full and fair opportunity to litigate], the court did
not concern itself with any such limiting concept as the multiple-claimant anomaly. We
have merely to permit ourselves to consider the actual circumstances of the case to appreciate the absurdity of any suggestion that the Los Angeles verdict was an "aberration,"
and certainly there was no collusive maneuvering by the plaintiffs to select an oppressive
forum for a test case.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The confusion between the lack of full and fair opportunity and
the possibility that a given outcome is unrepresentative is apparent.
73. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 37.
74. See id. at 31. Currie's perception of the problem has completely dominated the debate, even when his conclusion is challenged. In a real sense, Bernhard itself is not debated at
all. Only Currie's description of Bernhard, see note 72 supra, is debated, but it is precisely his
description that is at fault. His critics have lost before they have begun because they have
failed to free themselves from the constraints of his full and fair opportunity analysis, He is
convinced that the crux of the issue is whether or not the party to be precluded has received a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. What Currie has done is to analyze Bernhard in terms that
make its problems appear to be fully analogous to those of collateral estoppel generally. Thus,
attacks on Bernhard are perceived to be attacks on collateral estoppel and both judges and
commentators come to believe that one cannot be rejected without rejecting the other-policy
arguments in favor of collateral estoppel can be enlisted in support of the Bernhard doctrine
without qualification and are deemed to be persuasive.
His first solution-mechanical rules designed to aid the courts in avoiding a case-by-case
analysis of whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate, see text at notes 62-63
supra,-was swept aside by the courts, which felt they could do justice without the benefit of
rigid formulae. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962)
ajfd. as to res judicata and mutuality sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F,2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58
Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962). Yet, they did so without questioning
Currie's basic premise. But that premise obscures the fact that the question of fair opportunity
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As the next subsection will demonstrate, Currie's initial suspicion
of the outcome dictated by Bernhard in his railroad hypothetical was
well founded. His subsequent rejection of the offensive/defensive
distinction was proper in the sense that whether the common party is
a defendant facing multiple claims or a plaintiff seeking to assert
related claims against multiple defendants does not affect the impact
of the abandonment of the mutuality requirement. However, abandonment of this distinction calls not for the application of the Bernhard doctrine in every case, but rather for the application of the
mutuality requirement. Contrary to the assumption apparently underlying Currie's second initial exception to Bernhard, the case
against the abandonment of mutuality does not depend on there being an "aberrational" outcome, or the risk of such an outcome, in a
particular trial. The common party is unjustly burdened, although
we have no more reason to be suspicious of the preclusive judgment
than we are of any other judgment. More particularly, the common
party is unjustly burdened by the abandonment of mutuality
whether there are two claims or fifty. 75
Focusing specifically upon Currie's two initial qualifications to
the abandonment of mutuality is perhaps unfair, since he later
claimed that these exceptions were inspired by an underlying concern for ensuring a full and fair opportunity to litigate. However,
even Currie's final position, that preclusive effect should be denied
only absent a full and fair opportunity to litigate, is not responsive to
the fundamental problem, for the inequitable burdens imposed upon
the common party by the abandonment of mutuality are not eliminated by a requirement that the common party have enjoyed a full
and fair opportunity to litigate. The common party should not be
precluded unless both the mutuality requirement and the full and
fair opportunity test have been satisfied.76
does not speak to the issues raised by his multiple-claimant anomaly, see text at notes 107-18
infra.
As a result, the courts failed to ask whether full and fair opportunity has any particular
relevance to the problems of mutuality and thus whether mutuality should be abandoned at
all. Having lost the battle but won the war, Currie applauded the farsightedness of the courts
who saw past his "cynical" reservations, and he regretted that he had suggested them in the
first place. Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 26, supra note 3, at 29, 32.
75. See text at notes 87-103 infra.
76. See note 109 infra.
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B. A Probabilistic Analysis of the Bernhard .Doctrine
1. The Abandonment of the Mutuality Requirement
The central theme of mutuality is the fair apportionment of trial
risks. By potentially precluding either party (if both would have
been bound) or neither party (if either party would not have been
bound), mutuality allows litigation risks to reflect only the merits of
the cases. The abandonment of mutuality alters the litigation risks
by forcing only one party to face the potential of preclusion in subsequent litigation, thus shifting additional risks to that party. In addition to altering the distribution of risks between the parties, the
Bernhard doctrine affects the measure of trial efficacy by generally
increasing the error rate.77
To see more clearly and to what extent mutuality and Bernhard
affect the allocation of litigation risks, consider the result in two hypothetical multiple litigation situations that differ only with respect
to the presence or absence of the mutuality requirement. Because
Currie initially suggested that Bernhard produces no objectionable
results when the common party is the protagonist,78 as have other
commentators,79 it will be assumed in both hypotheticals that a common party plaintiff seeks to assert related claims80 against a series of
defendants. As will become apparent, this assumption does not affect the alteration of trial risks produced by Bernhard. 81
Assume also that the plaintiff has a fifty percent probability of
winning his case, that is, that if the case were tried indefinitely, the
plaintiff would be successful fifty per cent of the time. 82 The general result reached in this analysis is independent of the particular
probability selected83-the fifty per cent figure is employed for ease
of calculation and because under such an assumption no single out11. See text at notes 100-04 i'!fra.
78. Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 381, supra note 3, at 316.
19. See, e.g., Semmel, supra note 1, at 1466-67.
80. "Related claims" denotes claims with a sufficient common basis to create a collateral
estoppel problem. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the common questions are
dispositive of each case.
81. See text at notes 89-90 i'!fra.
82. This hypothesis can only be hypothetical, since a case can hardly be tried indefinitely.
Nonetheless, the only essential assumption is that there is some probability that the plaintiff
will succeed, even if the probability can never be known exactly. Moreover, it can be known
to any arbitrary degree of certainty. See text at notes 37-49 supra.
83. If p is the common party's probability of success in a single trial, the probability of
recovering on a single claim is p. The expected percent of recovery on n claims under mutuality is still p. Under Bernhard the expected perce~t of recovery on n claims is

!L
n

l.~.

iiL_P'.
i=l

p<l and n > 1 implies

i=l

pi < p.
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come is anomalous in the sense that it is contrary to the majority
verdict. Initially, the significance of the total number of cases will
be ignored. It is assumed that the plaintiff has ten claims, each liquidated84 in the amount of $100. As with the probability of averdict for the plaintiff, the amount of the claim has no bearing on the
general conclusions of the analysis.
The impact of a full and fair opportunity to litigate will be analyzed separately in a subsequent subpart. For present purposes, the
fifty percent probability of a verdict for the plaintiff common party is
taken to be the result of all causes, including those that might lead a
subsequent court to conclude, under a full and fair opportunity analysis, that preclusive effect ought to be denied a prior judgment for
one of the defendants. Thus, the rule of collateral estoppel will be
treated as operating mechanically.
Finally, assume that no defendant is in privity with any other
defendant, so that under the traditional mutuality doctrine, as well
as under Bernhard, the common party plaintiff will not be able to use
a favorable judgment against one defendant to preclude any other
defendant from relitigating the common issue. Given this set of assumptions, if each case is tried separately85 and preclusive effect is
denied for lack of mutuality, all ten cases will be litigated.86 By hypothesis, the plaintiff can expect to win fifty percent of his cases for a
total expected recovery of $500. This result is illustrated in the mutuality column of Table I.
On the other hand, under Bernhard, once the plaintiff loses one
case, he will be precluded from· litigating the remaining cases.
While the probability of winning any single case that is litigated is
still fifty percent, the preclusive effect of a single loss makes the
probability of ever litigating a case dependent upon the outcome of
previous cases. This cumulative effect reduces the common party's
Thus, the mere fact that the common party faces multiple claims reduces his chances on the
merits for all values of p.
84. If the claims were unliquidated, the model would become unnecessarily complicated
by the addition of a function representing the probability of recovering a particular award.
Assigning a different value to each claim would make the ultimate average recovery turn on
the order in which the cases were tried without, however, affecting the general conclusion.
85. The,effects ofjoinder will be discussed in text at notes 91-94 infra.
86. In reality, after a few claims have been litigated and the parties have learned the relative strength of their cases, they might decide to settle or abandon the remaining cases. On the
other hand, if all parties were aware of the actual probability of success before incurring any
litigation costs (and were equally risk averse), they logically should agree to settle for precisely
the expected recovery or loss. But for purposes of this analysis it is assumed that each of the
ten claims is litigated.
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BERNHARD

MUTIJALllY

Expected
Recovery

Cumulative
Expected
Recovery

Probability of
winning trial

Expected
Recovery

Cumulative
Expected
Recovery

.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5

$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50

$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
$450
$500

.500
.250
.125
.063
.031
.016
.008
.004
.002
.001

$50.00
$25.00
$12.50
$6.30
$3.10
$1.60
$.80
$.40
$.20
$.IO

$50.00
$75.00
$87.50
$93.80
$96.90
$98.50
$99.30
$99.70
$99.90
$100.00

Total expected recovery

$500

Trial

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IO

Recovery if Probability of
winning trial
win trial

$100
$100
$100
$100
$100
$100
$100
$100
$100
$100

$100.00

TABLE

I

expected recovery from $500 to $100, as illustrated in the Bernhard
column of Table I. s7
87. The probabilities reflected in the Bernhard column involve the calculation of the
probability for a compound event, such as "plaintiff wins exactly three trials," from the
probability that the plaintiff wins a single trial, in this case .5. For purposes of illustration,
assume initially that the mutuality doctrine is applicable, so that a loss will not prevent the
occurrence of subsequent wins.
Where two events are independent, as these trials are assumed to be, the probability of
both occurring is the product of their probabilities, see text preceding note 33 supra. To
calculate the probability of three wins followed by seven losses, the probability of a win is first
multiplied by itself three times, P", and then multiplied by the probability of a loss multiplied
by itself seven times, (1-p)IO-n. However, there are many ways to win exactly three cases.
The ten events can occur in any order. The total number of ordered arrangements of ten
events is ten factorial, IO!. Thus, the probability of three wins and seven losses is added to
itself ten factorial times, that is, it is multiplied by 10!. Finally, account must be taken of the
fact that some arrangements are redundant. For example, taking the order W-W-L-W and
switching the first two elements does not yield a new arrangement. Thus, to eliminate multiple
counting of a single ordered arrangment, the total number of ordered arrangements must be
divided by the number of arrangements of the wins among themselves, n!, and by the number
of arrangements of the losses among themselves, (IO - n)!.
The result is
c(n)

= pn(l-p)IO-n

10!
n!(IO-n)!

where c(n) is the compound probability, pis the probability in the individual case, and n is the
number of wins in the compound event. Since p = (1-p) = .5, the formula can be simplified:
10!
c( ) - 510 •
n - ·
n!(IO-n)!
Under Bernhard, there is only one possible way to reach each outcome. For example, in
order to win exactly four cases, the plaintiff must win the first four and lose the fifth. Thus,
the probability of n wins is simply P"(l-p) = _5n+1. 1?1e last case is ~culated <ii!ferentl_Y
because it cannot be followed by a loss and need not be m order to termmate the senes. It IS
therefore calculated by P"·
An alternative method of illustrating the decrease in expected recovery under Bernhard is
to consider the probability that the plaintiff will recover from a given number of defendants.
Table A below shows the probability, when there are 10 defendants, of the plaintiff prevailing
over any given number of them under mutuality. Again, assume a 50% case.
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When the probability of wining a single case is initially assumed
to be fifty percent, each successive claim under .Bernhard is worth
only half as much to the plaintiff as its predecessor because it is that
much less likely that he will be able to recover. The presence of the
preceding claims decreases the probability that the common party
will recover on succeeding claims. The impact of the .Bernhard doctrine is dramatic and can be evaluated in terms of expected recovery
rather than mere conjecture. 88
No. of
Wins

Probability
(P)

Maximum Recovery
(R)

0
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IO

.001
.010

-0$ 100
200
300

.044
.117
.205

400

.246

500
600

.205
.117

100·

.044

800
900
1000

.010
.001

Expected Recovery
(P • R)
$

-0I
9

35
82
123
123
82

35
9
I

$500

1.000
TABLE A

When mutuality is required, subsequent defendants cannot raise an estoppel based on the
plaintifi's loss of a prior case. For example, there are many ways for the plaintiff to win
exactly five cases. He can win the ill'St five, the last five, every other case, and so forth. On
the other hand, under the Bemhard doctrine there is only one way for the plaintiff to win five
cases. He must win the ill'St five cases and lose the sixth. The results of the trials are no
longer independent. There is a flat rule that every case following a loss to the plaintiff also
results in a loss. The effect on the relative frequencies and the expected recovery is illustrated
in Table B.

No. of
Wins
0
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Probability
(P)

.500
.250
.125
.063
.031
.016
.008
.004
.002
.001
.001
1.001*

Recovery
(R)
-0$ 100
$ 200
$ 300
$ 400
$ 500
$ 600
$ 700
$ 800
$ 900
$1000

Expected Recovery
(P • R)
-0$ 25.00
$ 25.00
$ 18.90
$ 12.40
$ 8.00
$ 4.80
$ 2.80
$ 1.60
$ .90
$ 1.00
$100.40*

• The excess over one and the excess over $100 are caused by rounding off the individual
probabilities.
TABLEB
88. The fact that cases will be settled on the basis of calculations of the potential liability
discounted for the trial risk does not impair the argument. No doubt, the ill'St verdict will so
crucially affect settlements that even without Bemhard there will often be only one trial. Fur-
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Table I also refutes Currie's assumption that the multiple-claimant anomaly is avoided ifthere are only t'\\'.O claims. Since the existence of subsequent claims does not affect the expectation value of
preceding claims, the expectation value of the second claim is the
same whether there are two claims or ten. Thus, the situation in
which there are only two claims is not fundamentally different from
that in which there are ten. The total expectation value of two
claims is simply the sum of the expectation values of the first claim
and of the second claim. This sum is $100 under mutuality and only
$75 under Bernhard. While the decrease in total expected recovery
is not as spectacular when there are two suits rather than ten, the
effect of the Bernhard doctrine is hardly insignificant.
Although the common party in the preceding analysis was a
plaintiff (for the purpose of demonstrating that the multiple-claimant anomaly is not limited to the case in which the common party is
the defendant, as in Currie's railroad hypothetical),89 the conclusions
reached were without reference to the trial role of the common party.
ther, the settlement value to the non-common parties increases if the first verdict is in favor of
the first non-common party. While the initial expected recovery on outstanding claims may
be only 50%, after the first trial it may rise to 75%. See text at notes 38-41 supra. (Apart from
the psychological rewards of going to trial, parties refuse to settle because they disagree on the
expected recovery and because they are insufficiently risk-averse to make adequate concessions. Attempts to bluff and to maintain credibility may also prevent the parties from reaching a mutually advantageous bargain.)
The Bernhard doctrine affects settlement negotiations in two ways. First, it increases the
risk to the common party. The common party is thus impelled to accept a less advantageous
settlement than under mutuality. For example, where there are five claims at stake each
worth $200, and the common party's risk ofloss is .5, the amount effectively at risk in the first
case climbs from $200 to $387.50. See Appendix B infra. The common party should therefore be willing to settle for up to $193.75 rather than $100. How much of the surplus the noncommon party is able to extract will depend on how risk-averse the parties are and how hardnosed a bargainer the non-common party is. Second, Bernhard denies the common party the
full benefit of a favorable judgment. While the common party's risk in a single trial may fall
from .5 to .25 after an initial victory, Bernhard still increases the overall risk thereafter from
what it would have been under mutuality following an initial victory. Settlement negotiations
should reflect the additional risk.
89. Currie argues that there is reason to think that a defendant who has lost in the first case
has received less than a full and fair opportunity to litigate and that the judgment is therefore
more likely than succeeding judgments to be anomalous. But if there is an overall bias in
favor of plaintiffs, as Currie seems to suppose, that provides no basis for thinking that the
verdict in the first case for a plaintiff is less than representative. By hypothesis, the result is
likely to be reproduced in subsequent litigation, unless Currie supposes that pro-plaintiff bias
is peculiar to the first suit in the series. There is some indication, however, that that is precisely what he believes. He is concerned that the plaintiffs, by their use of the initiative, can
select the case least favorable to the defendant as the "test case." See Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev,
281, supra note 3, at 288-89. This is but another example of a persistent theme of the law of
collateral estoppel-that the judgment relied upon must be representative.
While Currie's reasoning justifies his offensive/defensive distinction, see note 63 supra
and accompanying text, he also used it to support his multiple-claimant anomaly exception-yet in his example of the anomaly, the first loss did not occur until the 26th suit. See
text at notes 55-59 supra. Had Currie stopped before taking this last step, his multiple-claimant anomaly argument would have been a reasonably petsuasive, if somewhat informal, state-
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If the common party were defending, the only difference in the hypotheticals would be that the recovery would become the loss
avoided. Where, as here, the Bernhard doctrine diminishes a common plaintiffs expected recovery from $500 to $100, it would increase a common defendant's losses from $500 to $900. Thus, except
to the extent that the initial trial posture bears on whether the common party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, 90 trial posture is irrelevant to the alteration of litigation risks attributable to
Bernhard.
The argument advanced by one commentator:-that the result
produced by Bernhard is no worse than forcing a common party to
litigate all claims at once so that any recovery is dependent upon that
single outcome91-is, as Professor Currie argued, 92 incorrect. If, in
the hypotheticals, all defendants were joined in a single suit so that
each would be bound by an adverse judgment as well as benefitted
by a favorable one, the plaintiffs expected recovery would be $500.93
Thus, the expected recovery when all of the defendants are joined in
a single action is the same as it would be if the suits were tried separately under mutuality, but it is not the same as it would be if they
were tried under Bernhard.94 There is a vast difference between
compelling a litigant to accept an all-or-nothing bet with even odds,
as joinder rules do, and weighting the odds heavily in favor of his
opponent, as the Bernhard doctrine does.
As has been shown, the common party class is inevitably victimized by the Bernhard doctrine, 95 at least absent the requirement to be
discussed in the next subsection that the common party not be precluded unless he has previously enjoyed a full and fair opportunity
to litigate. The question remains, however, whether this alteration
of litigation risks merely causes a random shifting of losses between
ment of the basis for the mutuality doctrine. His argument, however, is hopelessly entangled
with the question of full and fair opportunity. See note 76 supra.
•
Indeed, in a subsequent article, Professor Currie repudiated his own offensive/ defensive
distinction but concluded that mutuality should be abandoned in either event. Currie, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 28-29.
90. See text at notes 107-18 iefra.
91. See Comment, supra note 57, at 610-11, discussed in note 57 supra.
92. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 287.
93. The expected recovery would be $1000 (the amount at stake against all IO defendants)
times .5 (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff common party), or $500.
94. See Table I supra.
95. Besides altering the distribution of the loss (recovery) between the common and noncommon parties, the Bemlrard doctrine also produces a less equitable distribution among common parties similarly situated. For example, consider the situation in which common party
plaintiffs each have a 90% chance- of success in a single suit. The table below contains the
frequency distribution, with and without mutuality, in such a situation.
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equally worthy parties,96 a shifting which would have no impact on
the overall rate of error, or whether the Bernhard doctrine produces
measurably more erroneous awards. As will be demonstrated below, the latter is the case: Bernhard increases the error rate.
Recall that, in terms of the error minimizing strategy, the ideal
distribution of outcomes awards all judgments to the parties who
would be favored by the majority if their cases were tried indefinitely.97 This distribution is illustrated by Graph D, in which the
No.of
Wins

Mutuality

No Mutuality
(Bernhard)

.001
.011
.057
.194
.390
.350

.100
.090
.081
.073
.066
.059
.053
.048
.043
.039
.350

1.003*

1.002*

0

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

9
10

• Excess over one due to rounding off.
TABLE

C

With mutuality, the probability that a plaintiff with such a strong case will lose everything is
negligible, and the reasonably likely outcomes are clustered closely about nine. (This clustering becomes more pronounced as the number of cases grows larger. The deviation from the
mean as a percentage of the total number of cases grows smaller.) Under Bernhard, however,
a significant percentage of the plaintiffs recover nothing, while others, similarly situated, win
all ten cases. The results are fairly well distributed among the outcomes in between.
Joinder, see text at notes 91-94 supra, also results in different treatment of similarly situated common parties. If, in the preceeding example, each plaintiff joins his ten claims, or is
compelled to do so, he faces only two possible outcomes-he wins all or nothing. Thus, under
joinder, plaintiffs, although similarly situated with respect to the strength of their claims, could
recover very different amounts. On the average, nine will cover the full amount, and one will
recover nothing.
96. For example, this alteration of litigation risks might reduce the expected recovery of a
common party with a 60% case, only to offset this result by increasing the expected recovery of
a noncommon party with a 60% probability in another case. Although this may be inequitable,
it does not increase the error rate as it has been defined. Both 60% cases should yield a 100%
recovery. See notes 24-32 supra. Thus, any alteration of the distribution between them is
zero-sum with respect to error.
97. It might at first appear that if the case is a 60-40 case in terms of probability of success,
the error minimizing strategy would call for a 60-40 split of the recovery. Such a split is not
called for if error is measured by the amount of damages awarded erroneously (as compared to
the manner in which they would be awarded if the facts were known with certainty). Note
that uncertainty about the facts is not a basis for compromise in the sense that comparative
fault is. Assuming that the chances of success are a reasonable approximation of the subjective degree of certainty of the triers of fact (this need not be so, since in 60% of the cases the
jurors might be 80% certain of one conclusion, while in 40% they might be 80% certain of the
opposite conclusion) then 60% of those with a 60% case should receive a 100% recovery while
40% should take nothing. Awarding 100% to all of them thus yields a 40% error rate.
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shaded section represents awards for the common party. There are
no errors, since the judgment is always the best guess.

d(p)

0

.5

p
GRAPH D

As demonstrated earlier, Graph A illustrates the distribution of
awards if a claim is tried only once.

d(p)

0

.5

p
GRAPH A

Area II represents erroneous judgments in favor of the non-common
party-erroneous in the sense that the probability of a verdict for the
common party is greater than .5 and that the best guess would therefore be a judgment for the common party. Similarly, Area III represents erroneous verdicts for the common party. Together these two
areas account for 25% of all cases.98 Graph A can represent a single
If the award is compromised on the basis of the degree of uncertainty so that all of the 60%
cases are awarded a 60% recovery, the amount correctly awarded is 36%, and the amount
incorrectly awarded is 24%. The 40% parties who benefit from the compromise are awarded
40%. With a compromise, the amount correctly awarded is 16%, and the amount incorrectly
awarded is 24%. Thus with a compromise in damages based on uncertainty about the facts,
the aggregate rate of error rises from 40% to 48%. In other words, error minimiziue requires
the best guess, not a compromise.
The interest that such a compromise could reflect is the litigants' interest in avoiding risk.
By compromising on the basis of uncertainty, the risk of error overall is increased but the
magnitude of errors when they occur is decreased. The opportunity for settlement, however,
already accommodates this interest.
98. Although the error rates derived herein depend on the a priori assumption that all
relative frequencies are equally likely, see text at note 36 supra (it may well be that 40% and
60% relative frequencies are more likely than others), they do provide a rough measure of the
range in which the trial system operates.
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claim or multiple claims under the mutuality doctrine. In either
case, the expected average recovery (as a percentage of a total recovery) is represented by the line separating the shaded and unshaded
regions.
If verdicts were decided at random, the distribution of outcomes
would be that suggested by Graph E.
I

II

d(p)

5
p

0

1

GRAPH E

The erroneous awards are still represented by Areas II and III,
which together account for 50% of all cases. Thus, the effort expended in a single trial is aimed solely at decreasing the error rate
from 50% to 25%.99
The Bernhard doctrine alters the distribution of outcomes in the
manner represented by Graph F .100
99. Indeed, if we had a flat rule that one party, plaintiff or defendant, always wins, the
distribution would be represented by an entirely shaded square. The errors would be represented by the left half of the square rather than diagonally opposed quadrants, but the error
rate would still be only 50%.

d(p)

0

.5
p
GRAPH 1

100. This graph represents a generalized illustration of Table I supra. The information in
Table I with respect to the probability of the common party winning the nth trial is essentially
a vertical slice out of Graph F taken at the point p=.5. The intersection of the diagonal line
with the vertical line at p=.5 represents the .5 probability of winning the second case under
mutuality, while the intersection of the curved line with the vertical line at P"",5 corresponds to
the pn probability that the common party will succeed in the nth trial under Bemltard.
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d(p)

0

.5

p
GRAPH

F

If there are two claims, the expected average recovery for the common party on the first claim is simply p, his probability of winning.
On the second claim, however, the expected average recovery is p 2 •
The expected average recovery for a third claim would be p 3, and so
forth, as illustrated earlier in Table I for p = .5. Since p is less than
one, each successive claim is worth less than its predecessor. In contrast, under mutuality each claim is worth the same, as reflected by
the probability of success. The total expected average recovery is
less under Bernhard than under mutuality because that figure, under
either doctrine, is simply the sum of the expected recoveries for the
individual claims.
Ideally, some of the common parties who recover under mutuality should not recover. Region V represents the reduction in the
number of errors that can be attributed to the Bernhard doctrine.
Area VI, however, represents the additional errors incurred by virtue
of Bernhard. To the extent that Area VI exceeds Area V, Bernhard
results in a measurable increase in the number of errors. IOI
101. The area between the two curves for n number of claims can be found by integrating
the difference between them,
n

(p-¼

L

pi).

i=1
n

n

1=1

i=l

fa- ¼~ pi(dp) = r - !i L

r:;

= F(p)

Area VI equals F(1) - F(.5). Area V equals F(.5) - F(0). F(0)=0. Thus, the increase in the
error rate, Area VI less Area V, equals
n

F(1) - 2F(.5)

= (.5 -

,l
'
...L) - 2(.125 - l
n L_
1+1
n
i=l

n

' ~i+l)
L_
i=1
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Recall that even in the worst case, in which verdicts are entirely
random, the error rate can increase by a maximum of only 25 percentage points, from 25% to 50%. 102 If there are three claims, the
Bernhard doctrine results in a 1% increase in the error rate. With ten
claims, the error rate increases by 9 percentage points, and when
there are twenty claims, the error rate rises by 14 percentage points,
almost 60% of the maximum increase of 25% that would result if
decisions were made entirely at random. 103
n

1 ~ 1-.51
.25-ii
T+f

L

i=l
102. This statement also applies when verdicts are decided in favor of one party under a
per se rule. See note 99 supra.
103. Using the formula in note 101 supra for determining the increase in the error rate, the
increase under Bernhard when there are three claims is

3

.25-l
3

~..!::2'...

L_.i+

1

i=l

= 25 _ l. ( 1-.5 +
.

3

2

+

1-.25
3

1-.125)
4

= .25-.24
= .01.
For 10 claims, the increase is

10
1 ~ 1-.51

.25-w

L T+I
i=l

= .25 _ 102
L ( t-.5 +

t-.25
3

+

1-.125
4

+

..•

+~
)
11

= .25-.16

= .09.
For 20 claims, the increase is
20
1 ~1-.51

.25-20L_i+l
i=l

_ 25 _l._ 1,1-.5

-.
,;,=

20'-2

.25 - .11

= .14.

+ ~+ ~ +
3

4
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+

l-.520)
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That the Bernhard doctrine causes additional errors 104 is not
And when the increase in the error rate under Bernhard is calculated for Currie's example of
the multiple-claimant anomaly, see text at note 56 supra, the result is 19%:
50
I ~ l-.5i
25
· - 50 L_ i + I

i=I

=

.25

_ J_( 1-.5
50 2

= .25 = .19.

+ 1-.25 +
3

1-.125
4

+ ....+ 1-.5 so)
51

.06

Interestingly, when there are only two claims the number of new errors under Bernhard is
just balanced by the number of errors avoided. This might seem to vindicate Currie's laterrepudiated recommendation against applying the Bernhard doctrine when the common party
faced more than two potential adversaries. Using the formula in note 101 supra, we see that
the change in the error rate when there are two claims is
2

.25-l ~ ~
2L._ i+I
i=I

= _25 _

! l 12.5 + l-;-25)

= .25 -2I (.5)
= .25 -

.25

=0.
Elementary notions of equity, however, suggest that offsetting the reduction in the common
party plaintiff's expected recovery by the increase in the expected recovery of noncommon
party plaintiffs is less than fair, even though the overall rate of error is unchanged by any
potential distribution of recoveries between the two. See note 96 supra. This is particularly
true since the common party under Bernhard has to bear the costs of at least one trial while
one of the noncommon parties will not incur any trial costs.
104. Currie's reluctance to give preclusive effect to an "anomalous" result, see text at note
59 supra, suggests a strategy less extreme than Bernhard, that would decrease the amount of
litigation, would mitigate the harshni:ss of Bernhard, and would improve the error rate. That
strategy is to take advantage of the additional information generated by additional trials. The
common party would be precluded whenever he has lost a majority of the cases previously
litigated. The majority must consist of at least two cases. (This rule would bar preclusion in
one of the situations in which Currie was once willing to permit it-in the case of two claims.)
To see how this strategy would work, consider the results where the common party potentially faces six claims. A verdict for the common party will be denoted by v, a verdict for the
noncommon party by v. p(v) (or p(V)) will represent the probability of a given verdict, c(v)
the probability that a given verdict is correct. The expected recovery, r(v), is the sum of the
possible probabilities of a given verdict multiplied by the amount at stake. r(v) • c(v) and r(V)
• c(v) are, respectively, the expected recovery from a correct verdict for the common party and
for a noncommon party. Their sum is the expected recovery from all correct verdicts, thus
representing the overall success rate in choosing the correct outcome. The following table
presents the values for these probabilities and success rates.
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counter-intuitive. The Bernhard doctrine increases consistency by
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT VERDICTS
Trial

r(v)

c(v)

r(v) • c(v)

I
2
3

.5
.5
.417
.35
.3S
.329

.75
.75
.84
.90
.90

.375
.375
.35
.31
.31
.31

4
5
6

.93

r(v)

c(v)

r(v) • c(v)

r(v) • c(v) +
r(v) • c(v)

.5

.75
.15
.74

.375
.375
.43
.47
.47
.47

.15
.15
.78
.78
.78
.78

.s

.583
.65
.65

.72
.72
.71

.671

TABLED

These values were derived as follows:
Win all six:

p(v)
p(v)

Lose one of first 5:

= p6
= 5p5(1-_p)

This is multiplied by a factor of five because v can occur in any one of the first five trials.
Lose two of first five:
p(v) = 7p4 (1-p)2
With two verdicts for the non-common parties the situation is complicated by the fact that if
both occur within the first three trials the common party is precluded thereafter and cannot
win.the sixth trial. There are ten ways of arranging the two losses within the first five verdicts,
three of which result in losing two of the first three cases. Since three of the ten arrangements
are forbidden, given the premise that the common party wins and thus gets to the sixth trial,
the factor is seven. This general approach results in the following probabilities of verdicts for
the common party in each trial:
1 p(v) = p
2 p(v) = p
3 p(v) = pl+ 2p2 (1-p)
4 p(v) = p4+ 3p3 (1-p)
5 p(v) = pS+ 4p4 (1-p) + 3p3(1-p)2
6 p(v) = p6+ 5p5 (1-p) + 7p4(1-p)2
The expected recovery by the common party where the amount at stake in each claim is equal
r(v)

=1•

J

~(v)dp.

0

The percentage of correct judgments where the outcomes are v and v respectively are

c(v)

=

;;(v)dp
.,,.5..__,_ _
f;(v)dp

c(v)

1.51 - p(v)dp

= -o____

£~ -

p(v)dp

The error rate calculated as 1-(r(v) • c(v) + r(v) • c(v)] can be expected to remain stable at
22% for the following reason. The minimum requirement for preclusion is that the common
party lose two out of the first three cases, which yields a success rate of 78%. Occasionally,
more than three trials will be conducted because the common party will win two, and there
will be noncommon parties who have not litigated and who cannot, therefore, be precluded.
The rate is stable because, as the number of litigated claims increases, it &:comes increasingly
less likely that an "aberrational" (in the sense that it is less than 50% likely) majority in favor
of the noncommon parties will occur.
To state the matter another way, under Bernhard the probability that the common party
will be precluded never decreases because any loss results in preclusion. Under the suggested
rule, the percentage of wins and losses tends to stabilize at whatever the underlying probability
is. As the number of cases litigated grows it requires a larger variation in absolute numbers
from this percentage, to give the noncommon parties the transient majority on which preclusion of the common party can be based. As the size of the required deviation increases, it
becomes increasingly less likely that it will occur.
Note, too, that if the rule initially called for a simple majority, rather than at least two out
of the first three, the error rate would stabilize at 25%, the normal rate under mutuality.
This suggested approach overcomes the adverse affect Bernhard has on the error rate. The
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simply estopping the common party. But like the consistency of a
rule that the plaintiff always wins, the consistency achieved by
Bernhard is unrelated to the persuasiveness of the case. Bernhard is
merely a per se rule, a bias favoring the noncommon party. 105 Only
the fortuitous circumstance that he faces multiple opponents subjects
the common party to outcomes that are consistently less favorable.
The outcome of subsequent trials under Bernhard tells us only what
we already knew, that the common party is the common party.
Since that information bears no consistent relationship to the merits
of the case, 106 errors are more prevalent under Bernhard. The difference in the common party's recovery, as exemplified in Table I,
quantifies the extent to which the aggregate outcome under Bernhard
reflects our best judgment on the merits and the extent to which it
merely reflects the anti-common party bias. 107
2. Full and Fair Opportunity To Litigate
The unqualified abandonment of mutuality causes intolerable inequities and diminishes the accuracy of the trial process. Does the
difficulty with the approach is thus purely a matter of equity. No shifting of losses between
parties equally worthy, whether those parties are common parties, noncommon parties or a
combination of the two, can adversely affect the rate of error. See note 96 supra. But of
these two possibilities, equal recovery by equally worthy parties is to be preferred. Yet, under
the proposed rule of preclusion an increasing proportion of the correct awards goes to the noncommon parties (r(v)), even though the overall rate of correct verdicts remains stable at 78%.
(Note the shift between columns r(v) and r(v) in the table above.)
105. The judicial system, like any system designed to organize information, is prone to two
sorts of errors: randomizing errors and biases. A randomizing error decreases the consistency
of the outcomes; it dissipates information. A bias, on the other hand, has informational content, but that information is legally irrelevant.
A randomizing error forces relative frequencies toward 50%. At that point no informational content can be attributed to the trial outcomes taken as a whole. Thus, ifwe are to have
confidence in our determinations, we must strive first of all for consistency. But, consistency
alone is not enough. We must seek to achieve a consistent product without introducing biases
to which the consistency may be attributed. For example, a rule that a plaintiff always wins
will yield perfectly consistent results. Under the absolute bias favoring the plaintiff, the informational content of the trial product is at a maximum. But what does the process tell us?
Simply what we already knew-that the plaintiff always wins. Rather than reflecting our best
judgment about the evidence available to us, the result is attributable to factors entirely irrelevant to the merits.
J06. If the information does bear a consistent relationship to the merits of the case it is
redundant, since the trier of fact will have used the information in reaching a verdict.
107. The purpose of adopting 50% as the probability for the hypothetical in the text can
now be better understood. The 50% case is the equipoise case, the case neutral on the merits.
Thus, any deviations in outcome from 50% provide an estimate of the magnitude of the bias
introduced by Bemhard unskewed by the merits.
An ordinary litigant with a claim as strong as his opponent's suffers no such disability.
But the more "common" the common party, the more the aggregate outcome reflects the
Bemhard bias. The greater the number of related claims, the greater the prejudice to the
common party, as Table I demonstrates. When there are only two claims the average reduction is 25%, as compared to an 80% reduction when there are ten, although in each case the
total amount at stake is the same.
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full and fair opportunity test ameliorate these problems? Critics
have complained that the mutuality doctrine is too mechanical a
rule, that it denies courts needed flexibility. 108 Commentators have
proposed that the flexible tool which modem justice requires would
be a rule that precludes a party who has litigated and lost unless, by
design or circumstance, that party has been denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate. 109 The appeal of such an approach is obvious. On its face, Bernhard rejects a black letter rule, which by virtue
of its very simplicity is presumed to be inadequate, in favor of a
standard which, by virtue of its complexity, is presumed to reflect
more accurately the policies of res judicata. In assessing the effect of
the Bernhard doctrine on the distribution of risks, it was initially assumed that the full and fair opportunity test is always satisfied. The
conclusions reached under this assumption are sufficient to demonstrate the flaws in Bernhard even when the full and fair opportunity
test is incorporated in that doctrine. 110 As long as there are some
cases in which the test will be met and in which the common party
108. See, e.g., Note, Collateral Estoppel· The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41
Mo. L. REv. 521, 529 (1976).
109. See Currie, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, supra note 3, at 28-29. q. the statement in Note,
supra note 108, at 529: "[C]ourts should proceed on a case by case basis and consider the
particular facts of each case in determining whether mutuality should be required." The implication of this statement is that there are some circumstances under the full and fair opportu•
nity test in which preciusion would be permitted but for the fact that mutuality is lacking.
Some support for this implication is found in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app.
§ 88 (Tent Draft No. 3, 1976). But even if mutuality has some role to play under the full and
fair opportunity analysis, it is not through a case-by-case determination of whether mutuality
is required. The Restatement full and fair opportunity test is, rather, a case-by-case determi•
nation of whether preclusion should be permitted in which mutuality is but one of a list of
factors to be taken into account
110. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); text
at note 74 supra.
The deficiencies in a prior trial that would lead a court to find there was not a full and fair
opportunity to litigate are not the kind which would subject the prior judgment to collateral
attack or even to reversal on appeal.
A comprehensive list of the various factors which should enter into a determination
whether a party has had his day in court would include such considerations as the size of
the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation,
the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of
a com_promise verdict, differences in the applicable law and forseeability [sic] of future
litigation.
Schwartz v. Public Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 724, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961
(1969). Six of the nine factors listed above relate either to the magnitude of the liability that
would be thought to hinge on the outcome of the initial trial, or to the conduct of the trial
participants that would ordinarily depend heavily on the magnitude of that liability, such as
the extent of litigation, the experience of counsel or a compromise verdict. In other words,
these six factors are directed at ensuring that the conduct of the trial that is to be relied on did
not vary substantially from what might be expected if the participants had been consciously
litigating both claims. The question of full and fair opportunity is simply whether the prior
suit may be considered a fair representative of the trial to be precluded. See also REsTATE•
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. §§ 68.1, 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (listing factors to be
considered in determining whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate),
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has some chance of winning on the merits, Bernhard will reduce that
chance by precluding the common party after just one loss. Thus,
unless the Bernhard supporters are prepared to maintain that all inconsistencies in outcome are attributable to the lack of full and fair
opportunity (ie., that the evidence itself is never ambiguous), so that
a party who loses after a full and fair opportunity to litigate would
never have won the case even if it were relitigated indefinitely, m Bernhard's supporters must concede that preclusion will alter the common party's risks.
Discussion need not be limited to those cases for which the full
and fair opportunity standard is met, however, since the probabilistic
model can be adjusted to take the full and fair opportunity test into
account. Initially, it was assumed that the fifty percent probability
that the common party will lose a given case is attributable to all
cases. But trials can be separated into two classes, those that meet
the full and fair opportunity test and those that do not. Under the
Bernhard doctrine, only those in the former class are given preclusive effect. Since another contingency apart from a favorable judgment-ie., lack of full and fair opportunity-can frustrate
preclusion, the common party's chances are slightly better than they
would be if preclusion were automatic. Suppose, for example, that
there is a ten percent chance that a loss by a common party with a
fifty percent case will subsequently be denied preclusive effect because of a lack of full and fair opportunity. As Table II demonstrates, if there are three claims for $100 each, the common party's
recovery climbs from $87.50 under Bernhard applied mechanically
to $92.63 under Bernhard with the full and fair opportunity test.
The recovery under mutuality is $150. 112
Ill. This proposition is untenable, since a case submitted to a jury, for example, is by
definition one about which reasonable persons might disagree. To argue that a determination
that there was full and fair opportunity means that the losing common party never could have
won is to argue that the previous trial should have resulted in a directed verdict for the noncommon party. Full and fair opportunity ensures that the risk of loss in the prior case was not
disproportionate to the average risk ofloss. It in no sense guarantees that a case decided with
full and fair opportunity will accord with the majority view. See note 109 supra.
112. Calculating the probabilities under these circumstances is a considerably more complex task, which is why Table II was limited to the case of three claims. For example, there
are now several ways for the common party to lose all of the suits. He can lose the first case
and have the subsequent courts fmd that he had a full and fair opportunity (preclusion), lose
the first without a fair opportunity (no preclusion) and the second with a fair opportunity
(preclusion), and so forth. Using W to indicate a win, and UL to indicate an unfair loss, the
probabilities are calculated below. The probability of a win, as before, is assumed to be .5.
He is precluded only by a "fair'' loss.
There are two ways for the common party to reach the second suit. He can win t4e first, or
he can lose the first without a full and fair opportunity:
P(W)

= .5

P(UL) = .5 X .1 = .05
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Bernhard without
full and fair
opportunity

Mutuality

Trial
number

R

p

P.R

p

P•R

1
2
3

$100
100
100

.5
.5
.5

$50
50
50

.5
.25
.125

$50.00
25.00
12.50

$150

TABLE

$87.50
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Bernhard with
full and fair
opportunity
p
P•R
.5
.275
.1513

$50.00
27.50
15.13
$92.63

II

The assumption underlying Table II is that no relationship exists
between the likelihood of success and the likelihood of a subsequent
finding of full and fair opportunity. As a first order approximation,
this assumption is useful, but it unrealistically implies that the fairness of a trial is a random factor with no informational content relevant to the likely or proper outcome of the trial. In reality there are
three factors with which a determination of full and fair opportunity
might be associated: the presence or absence of randomizing errors,
the presence or absence of biases, and the merits of the case.
The effect of denying preclusion by finding no full and fair opportunity in cases where lack of full and fair opportunity is positively correlated with the presence of a randomizing error can
profitably be compared with the results under Bernhard when a determination that there has been full and fair opportunity has no such
correlation; under Bernhard applied without considering full and
fair opportunity; and under mutuality. Suppose that overall the
common party has a 80% case but that there is a 10% probability of a
randomizing error. Further assume that this error is completely
randomizing, that is, that the probability of winning a case in which
the error appears is 50%. 113 Table III compares the results under
Thus, the probability that the common party will win the second suit is .5 x (.5 + .05) or .275.
Similarly, the probability that the common party will reach the third suit is
P(WW) = .5 X .5 = .25
+ P(W UL) = .5 X .05 = .o25
+ P(UL W) = .05 X .S = .o25
+ P(UL UL) = .OS X .OS = .0025
.3025
The probability of winning the third suit is then .S x .3025 or .1513.
The 10% figure is of course arbitrary. Additionally, there is no reason why it should re•
main constant. Indeed, since the foreseeability of future claims is an important element of
fairness, it would be an unusual case in which the common party could successfully raise the
unfairness defense to preclusion more than once. However, the example serves to provide a
fair estimate of how slight the effect of the full and fair opportunity caveat to the Bernhard
doctrine is.
113. If the overall probability of success is to be 80%, the probability of winning a case in
which the randomizing error does not appear must be 83.3%. With W denoting a win, Re
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each of the rules for three $ 100 cases. 114
denoting the presence of a randomizing error, and Re denoting the absence of a randomizing
error, the probability of winning when there is no randomizing error is derived as follows:

= P(WjRe) • P(Re) + P(WjRe) •
= .5 x .1 + P(WIRe) x .9
= .05 + P(WIRe) x ·.9
P(WjRe) = -~~
= .833
P(W)
.8
.8

P(:Ile)

114. Recall that in the previous example (under Bernhard with full and fair opportunity)
there was a 10% chance that a loss by the common party would subsequently be denied preclusive effect. See text at note 111 supra. Columns A, B and C simply reflect Table II supra
adjusted for an 80% case. Thus, the values in column C are calculated as follows:
The probability that the common party will win the second suit equals the probability of
winning a given suit, .8, times the probability of reaching the second suit, (P(W) + P(UL)), or
.8 X (.8

+ .2X . 1)

= .8 X .82

= .656.
Similarly, the probability that the common party will reach the third suit without being
precluded is
P(W W) = .8 X .8
= .64
+ P(W UL) = .8 X .02 = .016
+ P(UL W) = .02 X .8 = .016
+ P(UL UL) = .02 x .02 =.0004
.6724
and the probability of winning the third suit is then .8 x .6724 = .5379.
Column D represents the situation in which there could be a finding of lack of full opportunity (of which there is a 10% chance) only in cases in which a randomizing error is present
(which changes the probability of success or failure to .5). Thus, the probability of reaching
the second suit without being precluded is P(W) + P(UL), or P(W) + P(LjRe) • P(Re)
= .8 + .5 X .}
= .8 + .05
_
= .85.
Thus the probability of winning the second suit is

= .8 + .5 X .1
= .8 + .05
= .85.
Thus the probability of winning the second suit is .8 X .85 = .68.
The probability of the common party reaching the third suit without being precluded is
P(WW)

= .8 X

.8

= .64

+ P(WUL) =.8X.05 = .04
+ P(UL W) = .05 X .8 = .04
+ P(UL UL) = .05 X .05 = .0025
.7225
and the probability of winning the third suit is .8 X .7225 = .578.
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D

C

B,rnhard with full
B,rnluudwith
Trial
No.

Mutuality
Recovery

p

$100
.8
1
.8
100
2
100
.8
3
Total Expected Recovery

P • R

$80
80
80
$240

&rnluud with

no full and fair
opportunity
p
PeR

.8
.64
.512

$80.00
64.00
51.20
$195.20

TABLE

full and fair
opportunity
p
P•R

.8
.656
.5379

$80.00
65.60
53.79
$199.39

and fair opportunity
related to a
randomizing error
p
PeR

.8
.68
.578

$80.00
68.00
57.80
$205.80

III

The common party's expected recovery under mutuality is $240.
Under Bernhard applied with no full and fair opportunity test the
recovery is reduced to $195.20. Applying Bernhard with a full and
fair opportunity test that randomly denies preclusive effect to 10% of
the losses raises the recovery to $199.39. If, on the other hand, full
and fair opportunity is related to a completely randomizing error so
that only losses occurring in the 90% of the cases in which the randomizing error is not present, are given preclusive effect, the recovery is raised further to $205.80. Even if judges accurately employ
the full and fair opportunity test to deny preclusive effect to judgments arising from unrepresentative trials, full and fair opportunity
cannot be a substitute for mutuality. Nor is mutuality merely a
mechanical analogue of the full and fair opportunity test. The manner in which their effects were calculated indicates that they are
functionally quite different. Full and fair opportunity weeds out
cases in which the common party was peculiarly unlikely to succeed.
Mutuality harmonizes the outcomes of single party and multiparty
litigation so that the trial system as a whole is coherent.
If the errors are biases rather than randomizing errors, the specific figures may change, but the general principle remains the same.
By selectively denying preclusive effect to a class of cases in which,
because of the presence of some anti-common party bias, the common party is peculiarly likely to lose, the full and fair opportunity
doctrine does more to improve the common party's chances than
does the random denial of preclusive effect to the same number of
cases. However, since the full and fair opportunity doctrine cannot
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serve to permit the preclusion of any of the common party's opponents, and since the mutuality doctrine would deny preclusion altogether, the full and fair opportunity doctrine, to the extent that it
focuses on randomizing errors and biases that relate to procedural
matters, can only mitigate the impact of the abandonment of mutuality.
The third possibility, however, is that a determination of full and
fair opportunity is somehow related to the merits of the case. The
full and fair opportunity doctrine might be employed to deny preclusive effect whenever the prior judgment is unrepresentative in the
fullest sense of the word-that is, whenever the judgment does not
accord with the majority
view. 115 Suppose that the full and fair op1
portunity test were perfectly discriminating: suppose, that is, that
preclusion were never permitted against a common party with a better than 50% case and were always permitted otherwise. The resulting distribution of awards is represented in Graph G, which is
simply a combination of Graph A (the result under mutuality) for p
greater than .5 and Graph B (the result under the abandonment of
mutuality) for p less than .5.
If, as is assumed in Graph G, a judge faced with a plea of collateral estoppel were actually capable of discerning the majority view
by reviewing the prior action for full and fair opportunity, the
Bernhard doctrine would be wholly unobjectionable; Graph G approximates Graph D (the ideal distribution) more closely than does
Graph A. Although the recovery for common parties with better
than 50% cases cannot be increased beyond what it would be under
mutuality, the common parties estopped to relitigate are those who,
ideally, should not recover at all. Thus there is a decrease in the
rate of error.
But the full and fair opportunity test cannot be administered so
as to reflect the merits of the case and thus to produce the results
115. This may perhaps be what Currie meant by "aberration" when he spoke of denying
preclusion to an aberrational case. In other words, he may have meant that an aberrational
case is any verdict which is in the hypothetical minority, less than 50% likely, rather than one
that is extremely unlikely. Indeed, he originally stated that our aversion to giving preclusive
effect to a judgment which is in the actual minority of those tried to date (in his hypothetical,
one out of twenty-six), stems from the conviction that it "must be an aberration." Currie, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 289. It is, of course, possible for someone with a 50%
probability of winning to win only one out of twenty-six trials, but it is extremely unlikely-the odds against it are 2,581,109:1. If Currie's language reflects an awareness of the
implications of the distinction between risk and outcome, that awareness vanished in his subsequent analysis. See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text.
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0

.5
GRAPH G

0

.5
GRAPH A

0

.5

0

.5

GRAPHB

GRAPH D

COMMON PARTY'S Exl'ECTED RECOVERY

illustrated in Graph G. On its face, the test purports to concern
itself with purely procedural matters 116-randomizing errors and biases-the elimination of which cannot raise the recovery of a common party with better than a 50% case under Bernhard to the level
ac~eved under mutuality. 117 Moreover, if it were possible for the
subsequent judge to determine whether the common party has a better than 50% case and thus should be precluded, we could enjoy the
ideal system contemplated by Graph D merely by having every case
reviewed for full and fair opportunity. For a trial judge to relate
full and fair opportunity to the merits of the preceding case is for
him to make his own decision on the merits and then to invoke the
prior judgment to justify his usurpation of the jury's function in the
second case. 118 Thus, unless it is expanded to unrealistic and unin116. See the factors to be.considered in determining whether there has been a full and fair
opportunity to litigate set forth in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1976).
117. See Table III supra.
I 18. Where mutuality has been abrogated, courts are probably manipulating full and fair
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tended dimensions, the full and fair opportunity element of
Bernhard does not meet the objections to the abandonment of mutuality.
C.

Summary of Objections to the Abandonment of Mutuality

That Bentham's disparaging allusion to the gaming table should
become the rallying cry of mutuality's critics 119 is ironic, for there is
no more persuasive argument on behalf of mutuality than that provided by the application of probability theory to litigation risks.
While the bench may consider analogies between gaming and litigation unseemly, every trial lawyer knows that litigation is a gamble.
Thus, it should not be surprising that elementary notions of fair play
born at the gaming table find ready application at the bar.
The central theme of mutuality is the fair distribution of litigation risks. As the previous subsection demonstrated, the abandonment of mutuality significantly alters the distribution of such risks
and imposes inequitable burdens on the party who faces multiple
opponents. Only by ignoring or failing to recognize the risk allocation function of the mutuality requirement have the supporters of
Bernhard been able to conclude that concern for judicial efficiency
can justify abandoning mutuality. 120 The Bernhard doctrine is inopportunity to reflect their view of the merits of the case. Courts are able to do this because
there are no articulated criteria for such judgments and because it is carried on sub silentio.
For example, in Bemer v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), the court, in withholding preclusion, distinguished its
ruling of the prior year applying Bernhard, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 934 (1964), on the ground that "the issues [in Zdanok]-interpretation of
a collective bargaining contract-were not likely to be decided on the basis of a jury's choice
among different factual inferences, as was the case here." 346 F.2d at 541.
The court may have been suggesting that only those judgments that are unlikely to be
decided differently in a subsequent proceeding ought to be given preclusive effect. The court
implies that jury trials are more likely to result in inconsistent verdicts than bench trials and
that the fact of a trial by jury is therefore a justification for withholding preclusion. More
probably, courts may simply be more willing to find full and fair opportunity when they approve of the verdict in the first trial. But cf. Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 957 (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("had it been proper for the district court to consider the additional proof adduced by
the defendant at the second trial it seems to me to be clear beyond peradventure of a doubt
that the [precluded party] profferred the only tenable view of the . . . agreement").
Indeed, in Zdanok the court held that a new defense against a new plaintiff could not be
raised only after it detailed the reasons why it remained unconvinced of the merits of Glidden's case. 327 F.2d at 951-56.
119. See note 15 supra.
120. Admittedly, the authors of the Second Restatement, unlike some early commentators,
did not wholly ignore the issue of litigation risk when they adopted the Bernhard doctrine.
A party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded the
elements of due process. In the absence of circumstances suggesting the appropriateness
of allowing him to relitigate the issue, tliere is no good reason for refusing to treat the
issue as settled so far as he is concerned other than that of making the burden of litigation
risk and expense symmetrical between him and his adversaries. Equivalence of litigating
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compatible with the basic purpose of civil litigation, the equitable
redistribution of losses. In addition, the Bernhard doctrine demonstrably reduces the efficacy of litigation as a deterrent to anti-social
conduct. 121
The concern for the wise use of judicial and private resources
which motivates the supporters of Bernhard is certainly legitimate.
However, the proper focus is not whether mutuality should be abandoned, but rather whether society's interest in conserving resources is
great enough to justify more inclusive rules for compulsory joinder
of parties. Serving that interest through compulsory joinder rather
than by abandoning mutuality would avoid the inequities produced
by Bernhard. 122 Furthermore, to allow preclusion through the
risk, while a proper element in determining whether preclusion should be imposed, is only
one of several considerations relevant in determining the fairness of estopping a
party. . . .
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). Since the principal consequence of the abandonment of mutuality is the redistribution of litigating risks in a
manner that, standing alone, is inequitable, it is not clear how the Reporters intend equivalence of litigation risk to be weighed with other "considerations." The Restatement language
is reminiscent of the discussion of symmetry in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,421
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950), see note 14 supra, and of Greenebaum on the costs
of litigation, see Appendix A at notes A12-A1S.
There are two possible explanations for the Reporters' position. First, insofar as they perceive the matter as one of symmetry, the Reporters may regard the distribution of risks as an
aesthetic matter. Compare the logical inconsistency that results when one of the railroad
plaintiffs, see text at note SS supra, recovers damages and another does not. Although the
losing railroad plaintiff may be understandably piqued at the inconsistent outcome, he cannot
complain of an "erroneous" judgment in favor of another. His objection is merely that the
outcomes are "asymmetrical." No pecuniary interest of his is affected. The fact remains,
however, that where risk distribution is involved such asymmetries have material consequences.
The point is not that the risks must be symmetrical. The point is that the a priori burden
of a party should not exceed .S. Where the suit is bilateral, symmetry of risk is only an
incidental consequence. Where there are only two parties and one bears a risk of .S, the other
must also bear a risk of .S. In multilateral situations the risk distribution is rarely symmetrical, nor should it be. See text at notes 125-57 infra.
The second possible explanation is that the Reporters are comfortable with imposing a
greater than SO% initial risk in the name of fairness, efficiency, or whatever. While this may
satisfy the requirements of due process as currently understood, see Blonder-Tongue Laborn•
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (rejecting the mutuality
requirement in patent ligitation), it is an inadequate notion of procedural impartiality. The
only difference between risks is that the party burdened may have consented to one (or otherwise have brought it upon himself) and not the other. In that case, the only relevant criterion
is whether the party to be precluded could have joined the persons who seek the benefit of the
judgment and so have avoided the risk. But under the proposed § 88, this, too, is but one
factor to be considered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88(3) (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1976).
121. See text following note 22 supra.
122. See also notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that
compulsory joinder is not always just. See, e.g., Mccoid, A Single Package for Multiparly
Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 726-28 (1976). McCoid suggests that mandatory joinder can
cause claims to be lodged in inconvenient fora, can impair due process by overridingjurisdictional limitations, can induce claims that might otherwise not have been asserted, and can
deter the settlement of claims.

March 1978)

Mutuality

ef Esto_p_pel

663

abandonment of mutuality where joinder is merely permissive is
likely to discourage joinder and thereby frustrate economical use of
judicial resources by multiplying litigation. For example, typically
a common party defendant is not permitted to join all of the plaintiffs in a single action. This rule is designed to protect the plaintiffs'
interest in managing their own litigation. The abandonment of mutuality in the name of judicial economy, in such circumstances, rewards plaintiffs who exercise the prerogative to multiply litigation by
giving them the benefit of a verdict for the plaintiffs with whom they
chose not to join without requiring them to risk loss and preclusion.
Even where the common party is a plaintiff, a nonparty defendant who could not have been joined should not be allowed to take
advantage of a judgment against the common party. The inability
of the plaintiff to join a particular defendant is attributable either to
jurisdictional barriers designed to protect the defendant or to prevailing notions of prudent judicial administration. If the defendant
avails himself of his rights and refuses to participate voluntarily, the
plaintiff should not bear the cost of eliminating the additional litigation caused by the defendant.
Whether the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel will be revived or
will linger at the brink of death remains to be seen. The vitality of
the mutuality requirement may well be mooted by developments in
the rules ofjoinder. 123 At the least, however, the critics of mutuality
should not content themselves with an empty echo of Justice TrayIt might additionally be argued that the judiciary should hesitate to create compulsory
joinder when rules promulgated under legislative authority plainly contemplate permissive
joinder, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
123. One writer has suggested maintaining the mutuality doctrine in order to encourage
those able to do so to join all interested persons, to encourage those who cannot be joined to
intervene, and to discourage those who might obstruct joinder from doing so. Semmel, supra
note 1, at 1471-79. He proposes that a party should be precluded only ifhe could have joined
the nonparties who seek to invoke the prior judgment, and that a nonparty should not be able
to assert a prior judgment if he could have consolidated or become a party to the prior suit.
Since the plaintiff will be bound as to any defendants he could have joined, he has every
incentive to join them; only by doing so can he derive the maximum advantage from a
favorable judgment. What Semmel advocates is a weak form of compulsory joinder. Although the common party is barred by defeat, unasserted claims are not merged in a favorable
judgment.
The Restatement lists as one of the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of
preclusion absent mutuality whether "[t]he person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or
to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have affected joinder in the first action between himself
and his present adversary." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88(3) (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1976). The Restatement cites Semmel as support, although it recognizes the
possibility that a party may be precluded despite the fact that he could not have effected joinder. Id., Comment 3 (citing United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), affd. sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 951 (1964), discussed in text at note 66 supra).
McCoid anticipates the day when the threat that a defendant will be estopped to defend in
future litigation will be deemed a sufficient basis for a fmding that all plaintiffs are necessary
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nor's lament that "it is difficult to comprehend .
U]ust why a
party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded
from asserting it as res judicata." 124 They should instead attempt
accurately to balance the competing interests in judicial economy
and the equitable distribution of litigation risks.

Ill.

EXCEPTIONS TO MUTUALITY

A. The Risk A/location Function of Preclusion

Although the cases discussed thus far have involved multiple parties with related claims, the claims themselves have been essentially
bilateral-each claim has been assumed to involve only one plaintiff
and one defendant. It was demonstrated that the abandonment of
mutuality in these multiparty bilateral cases causes an inequitable
distribution of litigation risks. A determination whether mutuality
should be required becomes more complex in multilateral cases in
which more than one defendant may be liable for a single injury or
in which more than one plaintiff asserts a single claim. Typical of
multilateral cases involving more than one defendant are joint liability, joint and several liability, and derivative liability cases. These
multilateral, multiple defendant cases share several common features: more than one defendant exists from whom the plaintiff may
collect a single obligation; payment by one of the defendants generally discharges the liability of the other defendruJ,ts to the plaintiff; 125
and the defendant against whom the plaintiff obtains a judgment
parties. McCoid, supra note 122 at 724. An examination of existing compulsory joinder
rules, however, yields litµe language which can be so construed. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19:
A person . . . shall be joined . . . if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
P'.rsons already parties subject to a substantial nsk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Under this rule, compulsory joinder is not mandated in the typical common party situations.
Relief can be accorded among the parties despite the absence of a nonparty claimant, and the
ability of the nonparty claimants to protect their interests is not impeded by the suit, at least in
a case like United, where the fund from which damages will be paid is practically unlimited.
Finally, none of those already parties run the risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations that
could be eliminated by the joinder of additional claimants. To the contrary, under Bernhard
the common party's objection is that the chance of inconsistent judgments has been eliminated.
124. Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl. Sav. & Trust Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (1942); see note 9 supra.
125. REsrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 95 (1942). The Second Restatement provides that
the liability of other defendants is discharged only to the extent of the payment made. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 95(2) (fent. Draft No. 3, 1976). Thus, if the plaintiff
can recover a large judgment against one defendant, payment of a smaller judgment will not
relieve a second defendant of liability for the excess. However, in most instances, the new
§ 88, see id. app. § 88, would preclude relitigation of the amount of damages. Id. § 95, Comment d.
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generally becomes subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff with respect to the remaining defendants, 126 limited only by the extent of
his own liability to the plaintiff and by any equitable defenses or
personal immunities that the other defendants can raise. 127
Many of the traditional exceptions to the requirements of mutuality have arisen in the context of multilateral litigation. 128 Given
the inability of the commentators and the courts properly to identify
the underlying basis for mutuality in the relatively simple multiparty
bilateral context, their disagreement as to the application of mutuality in the multilateral context is unsurprising. The proper analysis
in such cases 129 can be illustrated by an examination of the multilateral multiparty situation presented by the principle of respondeat superior and the other doctrines of derivative liability which give rise
to the most frequent exception to the mutuality requirement (apart
from the complete abandonment contemplated by Bemhard). 130
Courts generally hold that a judgment in favor of the primary
defendant/indemnitor can be invoked by the derivative defendant/
indemnitee 131 to preclude the plaintiff, even though the principal, if
not a party to the suit against his agent, could not have been bound
had the judgment gone the other way. 132 The justification for this
exception to mutuality is uniformly approved; without preclusion ei126. See Pennwall Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist, 368 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
127. Not only is the subrogee subject to any defenses which could have been raised against
the subrogor, but he is subject to a variety of defenses personal to him that could not have been
raised against the original plaintiff through whom he claims. See REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION §§ 81-85 (1937). To the extent that the co=on law denies contribution between joint
tortfeasors, see id. § 102, it is essentially on these grounds. The tortfeasor is barred by the
doctrine of "unclean hands," a defense that the other tortfeasor could not have raised against
the plaintiff. See National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331 (1930). Many states,
however, now have a co=on law or statutorily created right to contribution among joint
tortfeasors. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 886A, Note (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
128. See Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311-26. Other situations for which there are
exceptions to mutuality include cases in which there has been secret participation in litigation
by a nonparty, cases in which a prior criniinal judgment is given conclusive effect in a subsequent civil trial, see note 1 supra, and cases involving privity of estate between predecessor
and successor. Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 327-29.
129. The principles developed in this subsection are equally applicable to the various permutations of derivative and joint liability, although the precise rule that is appropriate will
vary with the theory of liability.
130. See Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311, 322-24.
131. The typical respondeat superior claim arises out of the employment relationship, in
which case the agent/employee is the primary defendant and the principal/employer is the
derivative defendant
132. REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 (1942). See Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290 Pa.
331, 138 A. 849 (19,27). Cf. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225
U.S. Ill (1912) (nonparty joint tortfeasor not bound· by judgment adverse to his fellow
tortfeasor); United States v. Allsbury, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 186 (1866) (surety liability limited to
amount of judgment against principal debtor).
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ther the indemnitor or the indemnitee would suffer inconsistent liability if the plaintiff were to prevail in the second suit. 133 When,
however, the derivative defendant is sued first, or when there is no
right to indemnity, the authorities disagree with respect to whether
preclusion of the plaintiff should be allowed absent mutuality. Because either the primary or the derivative defendant may be sued
first, and because the derivative defendant may or may not have a
right of indemnity against the primary defendant, the principle of
respondeat superior gives rise to four types of cases:

Primary Defendant
(.D) Sued First

Secondary Defendant
(S) Sued First

Indemnity

Category I

Category 2

No
Indemnity

Category 3

Category 4

FIGURE

I

The First Restatement of Judgments allowed preclusion only in categories I and 3. 134 Category 1 represents the typical situation in
which preclusion is allowed in order to avoid the possibility of inconsistent liability. 135 The rationale for an exception in category 3 is
133. If a judgment against the claimant [in an action against the indemnitor] were not
res judicata in a subsequent action against the indemnitee, either the indemnitee would be
required to pay without the possibility of indemnity against the indemnitor, or the indem•
niter would be required to make indemnity for a claim which, in an action by the claim•
ant against him, had been found not to exist.
REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS,§ 96, Comment a (1942). See also id.§ 97 (derivative liability
in contract). The revisers for the Second Restatement, adopting the Bernhard rationale,
maintain that the primary basis for the § 96 exception and cases in accord with it was the
injustice of permitting one who had had his day in court to reopen identical issues by substituting a new adversary. Reporter's Note to REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99, Comments a & b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
While it is not clear whether it is the indemnitor or the indemnitee who would suffer incon•
sistent liability by the application of the mutuality doctrine in this situation, see id. § 99, Com•
ment b, the question has been mooted by the universal acceptance of this exception to
mutuality.
134. With respect to categories I and 3, the Restatement rule is that
[A] valid judgment on the merits and not based on a personal defense, in favor of a person
charged with the commission of a tort or a breach of contract, bars a subsequent action by
the plaintiff against another responsible for the conduct of such person if the action 1s
based solely upon the existence of a tort or breach of contract by such person, whether or
not the other person has a right of indemnity.
REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942). For the proposition that there should be no pre•
clusion in categories 2 and 4, see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96(2) & Comments j & k,
99 (1942).
135. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
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not as satisfactory, 136 particularly since category 3, along with categories 2 and 4, does not present the possibility of inconsistent liability.131
In contrast to the First Restatement, the Second Restatement and
the major commentators allow preclusion in all four categories. 138
However, the commentators disagree as to whether allowing preclusion in categories 2, 3, and 4 is consistent with the mutuality doctrine. Currie argues that preclusion in these cases is necessary but
that it is inconsistent with the principles underlying mutuality.
Thus, to Currie, these "exceptions" are precedent for the general
abandonment of mutuality. 139 Moore and Currier accept the appropriateness of preclusion in these three categories, but they disagree
136. Currie has been particularly critical of the Restatement's application of preclusion to
category 3 and yet not to categories 2 and 4:
I have always been suspicious of this rule. As the Restatement acknowledges, it has narrow scope, because most of the cases of derivative liability involve a right to indemnity.
In the rare cases that are left, no relaxation of the mutuality rule is dictated by the necessity of avoiding a situation of actual injustice such as that involved in the indemnity cases.
Within its limited effective sphere, the rule seems motivated by the intuitive notion that
the jud~ent in favor of the actor "destroys the basis" for the liability; but this is naive.
One mtght as well sal that the first fmding of negligence against our railroad destroys the
basis for the railroads defense. . . . If the actor IS exonerated and the person derivatively
liable is made to pay, there is no injustice such as is produced where the indemnity relation exists; there IS only an inconsistency which is readily explained by the limitations of
the adjudication process. The Restatement gives only one sound reason why the plaintiff
should be barred in this situation: he has had his day in court, and it is not unfair to deny
him a second chance against another adversary. But that is the rule of the Bernhard case.
There is no reason to confme it to the derivative liability situation and the Restatement
should logically adopt the Bernhard doctrine.
Currie, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 281, supra note 3, at 314. AccordREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
The First Restatement is not completely inconsistent. In favor of the Restatement rule, it
might be argued that it is fair to deny a second opportunity where, because of the plaintiff's
initial loss, the derivative defendant will be especially likely to be forced to bear the loss. If
the primary defendant is held liable in addition to the derivative defendant, there is at least the
possibility that the plaintiff will elect and will be able to levy on the primary defendant for all
or part of the judgment. Once the primary defendant has won his case, that option is foreclosed.
137. In contrast to category I (in which the agent/indemnitor is sued first and exonerated),
see note 133 supra, there is no risk of inconsistent liability in category 2. Even if the
agent/indemnitor is subsequently held liable, the judgment on behalf of the principal is only
logically inconsistent. It frustrates no right of indemnity because the agent is the one ultimately liable. Nor is there any possibility of a second attack by another party against the
agent/indemnitor if he prevails over the plaintiff (the plaintiff having already lost to the principal/indemnitee).
_
While in category 2 the possibility of inconsistent liability created by the indemnity relationship should be disregarded once a judgment has been rendered on behalf of the indemnitee, in categories 3 and 4 the problem never arises, because the derivative party has no recourse
in any event.
138. See ~TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Currie,
9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15; Moore & Currier, supra note I, at 3ll-16.
139. See Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 314-15. Accord REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) ("In historical perspective, the rule is chiefly explained as an early emerging exception to the mutuality rule.")
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with Currie that these exceptions are inconsistent with mutuality.
They maintain that these cases involve a legal relationship between
the derivative and primary defendants that distinguishes them from
other multiple party litigation in which mutuality traditionally operates.140
As will be demonstrated in subsection B, preclusion should be
allowed in each of the four categories and, as Moore and Currier
maintain, these exceptions are not inconsistent with mutuality. The
grounds for these conclusions can best be understood by considering
the allocation of litigation risks that occur in derivative liability
cases. 141
Although rules of preclusion ultimately distribute losses, the
commentators and the courts have failed to perceive that such rules
initially distribute the risk of loss. 142 Absent multiple or inconsistent liability, no outcome is per se anomalous. 143 Nonetheless, it is
unsatisfactory to avoid only the potential for an anomalous outcome
that arises if the plaintiff is not precluded in type 1 cases, for the risk
of a particular outcome can unfairly burden a litigant even though
the outcome itself is wholly unobjectionable. This simple observation makes possible the statement of a single principle that subsumes
both the mutuality doctrine and its exceptions: Rules ofpreclusion
should befashioned so that every litigant's a priori risk offailure, without reference to the merits, is no more than 50%. The a priori risk of
140. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 311-16.
Currie would find Moore and Currier's attempt to reconcile the mutuality doctrine with
preclusion in categories 2 and 4 unpersuasive. If he were inclined to accept mutuality, Currie
would prefer the First Restatement approach:
From the point of view of an adherent to the mutuality rule . . . no necessity exists for
allowing an indemnitor to plead a judgment favorable to the indemnitee...• The judgment in favor of the indemnitee disposes of any problem relating to the indemnity relation, and no necessity requires relaxation of the mutuality rule. • . . The [First)
Restatement is much more 1ogical (given its basic adherence to the mutuality rule): it
would not permit "the indemnitor" to plead the judgment favorable to the indeinnitee.
Currie, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, supra note 3, at 307 nn. 61 & 62. Accord RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 96, Comment j (1942); Semmel, supra note 1, at 1463.
141. The ultimate justification for preclusion in all four cases is that the plaintiff is entitled
to only one recovery·and has no legitimate claim to a reduction of his normal litigation risks at
the expense of the defendants. The legal relationship of the defendants is relevant because it
is critical to the theory of liability. It is not the "closeness" of the defendants that makes it
legitimate for one to invoke the judgment in favor of the other, as Moore and Currier seem to
imply, supra note 1 at 311-21.
142. But see note 120 supra.
143. By "outcome" is meant the entire disposition of the case. Holding the secondary
defendant liable while exonerating the alleged tortfeasor is one outcome anomalous by itself
where there is a right to indemnity. The converse, i.e., holding the primary party liable while
exonerating the secondary party, while not objectionable per se, may place an unfair burden
on the primary defendant if there is an unfair risk that it will occur.
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failure should be no less than 50% unless, solely because of his trial
posture and the theory of liability, a lighter burden is equitable.
The notion that a litigant's a priori risk of failure should not exceed 50% is simply a mathematical expression of the rules governing
the burden of persuasion in civil litigation. As shown earlier, in the
multiparty bilateral case the mutuality doctrine is essential if the
common party's a priori risk is not to exceed 50%. 144 In the bilateral
situation the rule that neither litigant's risk should exceed 50% implies that both parties face a priori risks of exactly 50%. Where,
however, litigation is multilateral, as in derivative liability cases, not
every litigant can bear a 50% risk because the total risk cannot exceed 100%. Thus, in multilateral cases the focus shifts from the concern that no party bear a risk in excess of 50% to the concern that the
reduction in average risk that accompanies the presence of more
than two parties be properly distributed.
Since rules of preclusion operate without reference to the merits
and are established in advance of trial, risks must be allocated solely
by reference to the theory of liability and to the roles of the litigants
with respect to that theory. 145

B. Probabilistic Analysis of the Exceptions to Mutuality
By examining the four derivative liability cases represented in
Figure 1, this subsection will illustrate the role that the theory of
liability should play in determining when preclusion should be allowed in multilateral litigation absent mutuality. Thi~ examination
will establish three points with respect to derivative liability cases.
First, cases in categories 1 and 3 (in which the derivative defendant
seeks to invoke a judgment rendered on behalf of the primary defendant), cannot reasonably be distinguished from cases in categories.2 and 4 (in which the primary defendant seeks to preclude the
plaintiff on the basis of a prior judgment favoring the derivative defendant). Second, to the extent that any distinctions can be drawn
among thefour categories of derivative liability cases, the proper distinction is between indemnity cases and non-indemnity cases, a dis144. See Table I supra. Note that the "events" listed in the table correspond to single
trials, for example, recovery from the fifth defendant. Tables A and B, note 87 supra, in
contrast, list composite events such as the probability that plaintiff will recover from five defendants. Table I thus illustrates the increase in the common party's risk with respect to individual opponents in the multiparty bilateral case.
145. But cf. note 118 supra, which suggests that where mutuality has been rejected, many
courts employ the full and fair opportunity rubric to impose their own judgments of the merits
of a case. This is an allocation of a different kind. It is, in effect, a judicial "compromise
verdict." The measure of relief is made to vary, not according to the nature of the injury, but
according to the degree of subjective certainty about the result
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.tinction drawn by none of the commentators. 146 Finally, in all four
types of cases exceptions to the mutuality doctrine are appropriate
and consistent with the principles underlying mutuality. Thus, they
provide no precedent for Bernhard.
1.

Categories 1 and 2· Right of{ndemnity

This Note next analyzes in probabilistic terms the propriety of
granting an exception to mutuality in derivative liability cases in
which the derivative defendant may indemnify any losses against the
primary defendant. Assume, for the sake of simplicity and to isolate
the effects of preclusion, that the case is a 50% case on its merits. In
addition, assume that the probability of success or failure on the issue of liability is the same whether the issue is raised by the plaintiff
against one of the defendants or by the derivative defendant in an
indemnity action against the primary defendant. 147 As a practical
matter, in respondeat superior cases the employer/derivative defendant will often be the ultimate source of the plaintiffs recovery, since
employees seldom possess assets sufficient to compensate either the
plaintiff or the employer seeking indemnification. However, as long
as the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity, the judicial system cannot ignore the possibility of inconsistent liability.
That the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity indicates
that the purpose of derivative liability is only to provide a deeper
pocket from which the plaintiff can obtain compensation, not to provide a "collateral source" of expected recovery. 148 The derivative
defendant is there only to assume the risk that the primary defendant
is financially irresponsible, not to assume the risk of personal liability without being able to obtain a judgment for indemnity. Thus,
provided the derivative defendant is not held liable without recourse
against the primary defendant, the derivative defendant will be
deemed not to have suffered a loss. On the basis of these observa146. See text at note 134-40 supra.
147. In reality, the probability of success will sometimes be less for the derivative defend•
ant in a suit against the primary defendant than for the plaintiff pursuing the primary defend•
ant, since the primary defendant may possess defenses against the derivative defendant that
are unavailable against the plaintiff.
148. "Collateral source" is used here in a peculiar sense. Ordinarily it refers to a source of
recovery that does not discharge the debt of the defendant. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP
JUDGMENTS § 95, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). That is not the rule in derivative
liability cases, since any payment received by the plaintiff discharges all defendants to the
extent of the payment. See id. § 95. However, where the additional defendant does lessen or
eliminate the litigation risk of the plaintiff, he is an additional "source" of expected or average
recovery.
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tions, the most desirable distribution of risks in derivative liability
cases in which the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity is:
risk of loss for plaintiff (P)
risk of loss for primary defendant (.D)
risk of loss for derivative (secondary) defendant (S)

.5

= .5
= 0

Ideally, to be consistent with the theory ofderivative liability, the risk of
ultimate liability should be distributed as though the case were strictly
bilateral. This ideal risk distribution for cases in categories 1 and 2

can be compared with the actual distribution of risks under both mutuality and an exception to mutuality. The attainable distributions
are tabulated in Table IV, 149 using the abbreviations P, .D, and S for
plaintiff, primary defendant, and derivative (secondary) defendant,
respectively. The indeterminate case in which P defeats both .D and
S but S loses the suit for indemnity is represented by I. The distri149. A discussion of the assumptions underlying Table IV and the method used to calculate the risk distributions appears in Appendix B.
In addition to the distributions appearing in the table, two other distributions are attainable
under a quasi-exception to mutuality. This quasi-exception occurs in category 2 (S sued first)
when a judgment rendered against P in a subsequent suit against JJ relieves S of a prior
judgment against him. This is in effect a mutuality exception, albeit one that operates only in
favor of S. The effect of this one-way exception is to make the risk distribution contingent on
P's decisions. Since P risks the loss of a favorable judgment rendered against S, he will not
proceed against JJ unless he must. Thus, if S can satisfy all or most of the judgment, the
distribution is still that of column E. The quasi-exception only limits P if he first defeats S ,
and then only if he elects to pursue JJ. Assuming no preclusion, if he loses to She still has
another opportunity to litigate the same claim. The risks borne by each party under this
quasi-exception are calculated as follows (the notation PIS means P loses to S; PwS means p
wins against S; etc.):
P's risk of loss:

PIS• PIJJ
PwS • PIJJ

=
=

.25
.25

T

JJ's risk (assuming subrogation):
PIS• PwJJ
PwS'ro PwJJ

.25
.25

T

This quasi-exception can also operate when preclusion is allowed, that is, when an exception to
mutuality is already recognized. Although P is precluded by an initial loss to S, a favorable
judgment can still be set aside if P sues .lJ for the residue and loses. In effect, the judgment
for JJ constitutes "payment" of the amount for which he is at risk. The resultant risks are as
follows:
P's risk of loss:

PIS
PwS • PIJJ

= .5
= .25
.75

JJ's risk of loss (assuming subrogation):
PwS • PwJJ
= .25
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bution of the loss thus depends on how P collects on the two judgments. The columns represent the various risk distributions that
result under different assumptions about the availability of subrogation and impleader and about whether the primary defendant can
prevent an indemnity action by the derivative defendant. For example, the risk distribution in column A occurs when S can maintain an indemnity action against .D even though .D has successfully
defended a direct action by P, but S cannot subrogate an indemnity
claim to a verdict for P against .D and cannot implead or vouch in .D
when defending an action by P. The assumptions that underly the
other columns are described in Appendix B.
Note that without preclusion P's risk of loss is .25. All of the
variations serve only to alter the distribution of risk between .D and
S. With preclusion, a risk of .25 is shifted from D to P.
No PRECLUSION
(No mutuality exception)

Case!
(D sued fu:st)

Case2
(S sued fu:st)

PRECLUSION

(Mutuality Exception)

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

p loses
D loses
S loses
I

.25
.375
.25
.125

.25
.5
.25

.25
.625
.125

.25
.75

-

.25
.5
.125
.125

ploscs

.25

.25

.25

.25

.125
.125

D loses

.375

Sloscs

.25

I

.125

.s

-

.s

TABLE

(F)

(G)

(H)

(I)

.25

.25
.15

- --

(K)

.5
.5

- --

- --

.625
.125

(J)

.5
.375
.125

.5
.125
.25
.125

.5
.25
.25

-

.5
.25

.125
.125

.5
.375
.125

-

.5
.5

--

IV

What is striking about Table IV is that the attainable distributions of risk absent an exception to mutuality are identical whether
.D is sued first or S is sued first. Thus, in terms of risk allocation,
there is no basis for permitting an exception to mutuality in the former case but not in the latter.
The commentators have focused on the ultimate outcome rather
than on the risk distribution and thus have designed rules that avoid
only outcomes that cause a single party to bear inconsistent liability.
But permitting P to sue D after losing to S still affords him two bites
at the apple. Since P has only a single claim, the second opportunity
to litigate necessarily decreases his overall risk of loss. Consequently, either .D or S (or perhaps both) must bear a heavier burden.
The presence of a third party, the derivative defendant, can reliev~
one or the other of the primary litigants of all or part of his share of
the risk. But with respect to the plaintiff, the two defendants are not
unlike a single entity. D and S have a consensual relationship that
requires S to guarantee certain obligations incurred by D. Presum-
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ably, some reciprocal benefit has induced S to enter the relationship
and assume that burden. How the loss is distributed between them
should be of no concern to P. He should not be the beneficiary of a
windfall reduction in litigation risk. Thus, if S is to share and
thereby reduce anyone's risk of loss, it should be .D's. 150
This is precisely the result when, as it should be for cases in both
categories 1 and 2, preclusion is allowed. The distribution of risks
under an exception to mutuality properly reflects the assumption
that the derivative defendant is only meant to assume the risk of the
primary defendant's financial irresponsibility. Distribution (K), the
ideal distribution, is obtained when preclusion is allowed and the
derivative defendant can implead the primary defendant or can subrogate an indemnity claim to a verdict for plaintiff against the primary defendant. 151 Even when circumstances are such that the
derivative defendant cannot be held harmless (as is the case for distributions (F) through (J)), at least it is the primary defendant, rather
than the plaintiff, who is the beneficiary of the risk borne by the
derivative defendant.
2.

Categories 3 and 4: No Right of Indemnity

The effect of preclusion in derivative liability cases in which no
indemnification right exists is illustrated in Table V, 152 which tabu150. In terms of the accuracy of the trial product, the error roioiroiziog strategy requires
that the plaintiff be granted judgment only when it is more likely than not that the primary
defendant was culpable. Where the unavoidable risk of error burdens the secondary defendant it would be inconsistent with the theory of secondary liability for that risk to benefit the
plaintiff.
151. The statement in the text is a bit sweeping. The statement is correct when JJ is sued
first. But when S is sued first, distribution (K) results only when preclusion is allowed and S
can implead JJ. See Appendix B.
152. Determining the distribution of risks absent indemnity is comparatively simple. In
category 3, column (A), the distribution is as follows:

P's risk of loss:
.PID • .PIS
D's risk of loss:
.PwD • .PIS

= .25
= .25

S's risk of loss:
.PID • .PwS

= .25

.PwD • .PwS

= .25

I:

Column (D) reflects the case under the mutuality exception in which .P is pi:ecluded by a
Joss toJJ.
.P's risk of loss:

J'ID
.PD's risk of loss:
.PwJJ • .PIS

= .5
= .25
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lates the attainable distributions of risks for cases in categories 3 and
4 under the same assumptions made with respect to Table IV.
The number of attainable risk distributions in these cases is much
smaller than in cases in which the derivative defendant has a right of
indemnity. In the only attainable distribution under mutuality
I:

PwD • PwS

= .25.

In the pure mutuality case, when Sis sued first, the distribution of risks is, again, the same as
when D is sued first. It is derived in the same manner as above. The distribution is shown in
category 4, column (A).
Column (B), however, incorporates the quasi-exception to mutuality discussed in relation
to category 2, note 151 supra. That quasi-exception permits a subsequent loss by P to D to
relieve S of an adverse judgment rendered against him in the first suit. The distribution is
computed as follows:
P's risk of loss:

PIS• PID
+PwS • PID
D's risk of loss:
PIS• PwD
I:
PwS• PwD

=
=

.25
.25
.5

== .25
.25

Column (C) is simply the mutuality exception. A loss in the first suit precludes any further
action by P. A victory by Pin the first suit either causes S (the indemnitee) to bear the entire
loss if D prevails in the second suit or results in the indeterminate case if D loses. (But
compare the distribution in category 3, column (D), in which D bears the entire loss if P fails
to prevail in the second suit. See text preceeding note 156 infra.)

P's risk of loss:

PIS
S's risk of loss:
PwS • PID

=

.5

=

.25

=

.25

I:

PwS • PwD

Finally, column (E) reflects the combination of the mutuality exception with the quasi-excep•
tion. Pis precluded by a loss in the first suit and loses the benefit of a favorable verdict in the
first suit if he elects to proceed against D and loses. (Such a case logically assumes S has
insufficient assets.)

P's risk of loss is then:

PIS
+PwS•PID

.5
== .25

:75

I:

PwS• PwD

.25

Mutuality
(no preclusion)
(B)
(A)
Category 3
(D sued first)

Category 4
(S sued first)
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I

.25
.25
.25
.25

P's risk of loss
D's risk of loss
S's risk of loss
l

.25
.25
.25
.25

P's risk of loss
D's risk ofloss
S's risk of loss

TABLE

Mutuality Exception
(preclusion)
(D)
(E)
(C)
.5
.25

0
.25
.5
.25

.5

.75

0

0

.25
.25

0
0

.25

.25

V

(other than (B), a quasi-exception to mutuality) 153 the plaintiffs risk
of loss is reduced from 50% to 25% by the presence the derivative
defendant. As was the case with respect to categories 1 and 2, under
mutuality the plaintiff has two opportunities to win the same
claim-once against the primary defendant and once against the derivative defendant.
The Restatement favors an exception to mutuality in category 3
but not in category 4. 154 The commentators, on the other hand,
agree that these two cases cannot be distinguished, but disagree on
whether a mutuality exception is consistent with the policies underlying mutuality. 155 Table V demonstrates that when no right of indemnity exists, no distinction can be made under mutuality on the
basis of which defendant is sued first. When an exception to mutuality is permitted, a distinction based on the order of suit does arise.
This distinction is attributable to the fact that only the defendant
sued first can be held solely liable while the other is either entirely
exonerated or liable only as part of the indeterminate outcome.
That the derivative defendant has no right of indemnity suggests
there is no overriding policy in favor of compelling the primary defendant to bear the loss rather than the derivative defendant. Thus
distributions (C) and (D) are equally acceptable, and no reason exists to distinguish between categories 3 and 4, with or without an
exception to mutuality. ts 6

of

153. See note 152 supra.
154. See REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96(2), 99 & § 96 Co=ents j & k (1942), discussed in note 134 supra.
155. See notes 139 & 140 supra.
156. A rule could be devised like the one suggested in the indemnity cases-the quasiexception represented by column (E). P could be deprived of his judgment against S to the
extent that he lias put D at risk and lost. However, the justification for the refinement in the
indemnity cases was to avoid subjecting one or the other of the defendants to inconsistent
liability, even though their aggregate risk is only .5. Here, absent indemnity, there can be no
inconsistent liability because neither defendant can be subjected to more than one lawsuit.
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A comparison of Tables IV and V suggests that if any distinction
is to be drawn among the four categories of cases, it should be based
upon whether or not the derivative defendant has a right of indemnity. Nonetheless, for much the same reason as was suggested in the
indemnity cases, preclusion should also be permitted in the non-indemnity cases. The absence of a right of indemnity only affects the
distribution of loss between the primary defendant and the derivative defendant; it is of no concern to the plaintiff. There is no reason
why the primary defendant and the derivative defendant, considered
together, should incur a litigation risk greater than 50%, as they do
under mutuality. 157 If the derivative defendant cannot avoid bearing some risk of loss, the theory of derivative liability suggests that
that risk should redound to the benefit of the primary defendant
rather than to the plaintiff. Thus, the appropriate result in categories 3 and 4, as in categories I and 2, is to permit an exception to
mutuality and to allow preclusion of the plaintiff.
IV.

APPLICATION OF PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES:

PENNINGTON V. SNOW

The preceding sections of this Note established, through the use
of probability theory, that in multiparty bilateral litigation the mutuality requirement is necessary to assure that the relative risks of the
parties are consistent with the burden of persuasion in civil litigation. It was then demonstrated that whether or not preclusion
should be allowed in the context of multilateral litigation depends
upon the theory of liability underlying the relationship between the
parties. In particular, it was shown that preclusion should be permitted in derivative liability cases whether the primary or the derivative defendant is sued first and whether or not the derivative
defendant has a right of indemnity. The inequities that can result
when the courts respond to a plea of collateral estoppel without adequately considering the policies expressed in the mutuality doctrine
are illustrated by a recent decision of the Alaska Supreme Court purporting to adopt the Bernhard rule.
In Pennington v. Snow, 158 Mr. Pennington first sued his insurance
company to recover medical expenses incurred by his wife. He alleged that Mrs. Pennington's spontaneous abortion of the fetus she
was carrying was caused by a low-speed collision between the Pen157. While the risk ofloss in the indeterminate case is not clearly O's or Ss, it is borne by
one of them, not by P.
158. 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970).
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nington vehicle and a car driven by Snow. The insurer prevailed.in
this initial suit, since Pennington failed to establish that the accident caused the miscarriage. Mrs. Pennington subsequently brought
suit for damages against Snow, alleging the same injuries. Snow
pleaded the judgment for Pennington's insurance company as a defense.159
On review of the trial court's rejection of the collateral estoppel
plea, the Alaska Supreme Court purported to adopt .Bernhard. 160
Mrs. Pennington was not a named party in the prior suit, but the
court held that she was in privity with her husband and bound by the
earlier judgment to the same extent that he would have been. 161 After deciding that .Bernhard was applicable to Mrs. Pennington's suit
against Snow, the court considered whether the full and fair opportunity requirement had been satisfied. 162 Observing that the prior
claim had been for a comparatively small amount and that the case
had therefore been decided in a court of limited jurisdiction, the
court held that Mrs. Pennington was not estopped to litigate the issue
of causation in her suit against Snow. 163
The situation of the insurance company in Pennington is similar
in some respects to that of the derivative defendant in the derivative
liability cases discussed earlier. 164 Had the company paid Mr. Pennington's claim, either upon request or because of a judgment for
Pennington, it presumably would have been subrogated to the Penningtons' claims against Snow. Since the insurance company is the
additional party to the bilateral dispute, any risk of ultimate liability
borne by it must lessen the risk borne by either Pennington or Snow
(or perhaps both). Assuming the court had found the full and fair
opportunity test satisfied, the decision to app~y .Bernhard, and thus to
preclude relitigation of the causation issue, would have given Snow
the benefit of the company's presence. Allowing Snow to preclude
Pennington from relitigating following Pennington's loss to the insurance company leaves Snow with only a 25% chance of being held
liable (assuming Pennington has a 50% case). Snow has two oppor159. 471 P.2d at 373.
160. 471 P.2d at 377. The court alluded to Currie's two suggested limitations of Bernhard,
471 P.2d at 377 n.14, citing Currie, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, supra note 3; but, fmding neither of
them applicable, declined to accept or reject them.
161. 471 P.2d at 374-76.
162. "Thus, while we hold that mutuality will not be required as a rule, it remains to be
inquired, in each case, whether there were any unusual or· exceptional factors in the prior
adjudication which would warrant the application of the mutuality requirement." 471 P.2d at
377.
163. 471 P.2d at 377-79.
164. See text at notes 148-50 supra.
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tunities to defeat Pennington: Snow wins if the insurance company
wins, and Snow wins if the company loses but he personally prevails
in the company's subrogation action. Pennington has only one opportuajty to litigate and therefore bears a 50% risk of loss. The company bears tlie remaining 25% risk, which represents the chance that
it will be found liable to Pennington ~der the insurance contract yet
fail to prove Pennington's claim in its subsequent suit against Snow.
The result dictated by the court's adoption of Bernhard is inconsistent with the actual relationship between the parties and with the
theory of liability underlying that relationship. What distinguishes
Pennington from the derivative liability cases is that in Pennington
the third party and the plaintiff shared a contractual relationship,
not the third party and the primary defendant. Pennington paid the
insurance company for the right to recover his losses. By doing so
he purchased an additional defendant. 165 If anyone ought to benefit
from the risk assumed by the company it must be Pennington, who
paid premiums that reflect precisely that risk. Thus Pennington
should not be precluded from litigating the issue of causation against
Snow despite his loss to the insurance company.
The correct distribution of risks leaves Pennington with a 25%
risk of loss, which arises because Pennington ultimately loses only if
unsuccessful against both the insurer and against Snow. Snow, on
the other hand, bears a 50% risk, for he can lose either by losing to
Pennington after Pennington has lost to the insurer, or by losing to
the insurance company after Pennington has prevailed against the
company. Finally, the remaining 25% risk falls upon the insurance
company, which loses when Pennington is successful against the
company which is in tum unsuccessful in its subrogation claim
against Snow. 166
165. Every contract right can be viewed as ultimately nothing more than the purchase of a
defendant. It cannot therefore be argued that the policyholder is somehow frustrating public
policy by proliferating defendants.
166. The risk distributions under preclusion as envisioned by the court in Pennington and
No Preclusion
(Proper Analysis)

Preclusion
(Pennington Suit)
Pennington's
risk of loss

P/I

Snow's risk
of loss

PwI• IwS = .5 X .5 =

Insurer's risk
of loss

PwI • I/S

=

=

.5 X .5 =

.5

P/I • PIS

=

,5 X .5

=

.25

.25

PII • PwS
. PwI • IwS

=

.5 X ,5
.5 X .5

=

.2s.1
.25

.25

PwI • IIS

TABLEE

=
=

.5 X .5

= I=
= .25

.5
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CONCLUSION

.Bernhard v. .Bank of America National Savings and Trust
Association stands for the proposition that one who has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue and has lost should not be
permitted to relitigate that issue merely because he has found, or has
been found by, a new adversary, even though that new opponent
would not have been bound had the prior judgment gone the other
way. This Note has examined and rejected .Bernhard's call to abandon the mutuality doctrine of collateral estoppel.
This Note began by demonstrating, with the aid of probability
theory, that the burden of persuasion in civil litigation embodies a
strategy designed to minimize the total number of erroneous judgments and that this strategy is based on the various disutilities society attaches to the different possible outcomes of litigation. This
Note then established that the abandonment of mutuality causes a
statistically certain decrease in the recovery of a party facing multiple opponents on related claims. This effect of .Bernhard is of concern to more than just the common party, for the mutuality doctrine
is designed to allocate trial risks in a manner consistent with the burden of persuasion, that is, in a manner designed to minimize the total
number of errors. Thus, the abandonment of mutuality harms the
system of civil sanctions by weakening the causal link between culpable conduct and trial outcome. This Note also demonstrated that
the objections to the abandonment of a mutuality requirement are
not met by a requirement that the common party be precluded only
if he has previously enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
Both the full and fair opportunity test and the mutuality requirement
should be satisfied before the common party is precluded.
Finally, it was demonstrated that the traditional exceptions to the
mutuality requirement are entirely consistent with an error minimizing strategy. None of the exceptions is precedent for the abandonment of mutuality except under the same flawed outcome analysis
that led to the .Bernhard doctrine in the first place. The underlying
theory of liability that defines the relationship between the parties
must be the focus when the risk analysis developed in this Note is
applied to the multilateral litigation cases that give rise to the traditional mutuality exceptions.
under the proper application of the requirement of mutuality are summarized in the preceding
table. (The notation .PII means "Pennington loses to Insurer," .PwS means "Pennington wins
against Snow," etc.)
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A

This Appendix summarizes and criticizes the arguments against
the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine.
First, it is argued that the abandonment of mutuality is not necessary in order to prevent multiple harassment, one of the traditional
objects of collateral estoppel generally. Thus, Moore and Currier
note that
X, the stranger, needs no protection against repeated litigation. He
does not ask to be relieved of litigation for a second time; he asks to be
relieved of the necessity of litigating at all. Clearly, then, the policy
protecting individuals from the harassment of repeated lawsuits does
not require, or even suggest, that X, a stranger to the litigation between
A and B, should be permitted to use A's judgment against B, either
affirmatively or negatively.AI

While there is no need for protection against multiple harassment
in multiple party cases, there remains the other traditional equity
ordinarily weighing in favor of collateral estoppel-the interest of
the state in concluding litigation. The commentators disagree about
the relative weight to be given these two factors. Greenebaum states
that while "many dicta can be found stating that res judicata exists
for public interests, in actual practice precluding litigation for the
benefit of a party who has no personal claim for protection is novel,
indeed, revolutionary."A2 On the other hand, von Moschzisker
points out:
[O]f the two principles which [res judicata] comprehends, the protection from the annoyance of repeated litigation, which the individual
suitor is afforded, is, after all, only an incident of the first principle,
that the best interests of society demand that litigation be concluded.
Economy of the time of the courts is one of the obviously beneficial
results . . . but the broader and even more important aspect of the
public policy of res judicata is its promotion of peace and quiet in the
community through the creation of certainty in the relations of men.A3

There is ample precedent for the assertion that the state's interests may justify concluding litigation expeditiously despite a possible
impairment of the interests of the parties.A4 Additionally, the state
may properly be concerned about the waste of the resources of the
litigants in repeated litigation whether or not they have previously
Al. Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 308.
A2. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at IO.
A3. von Moschzisker, supra note 1, at 299-300. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
A4. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (providing for compulsory counterclaims).
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been parties.As (It is difficult, however, to take seriously the Court's
suggestion in Blonder-Tongue that the common party is also a potential beneficiary of the lack of mutuality since he, too, will be spared
litigation costs. lfhe is forced to bear additional litigation costs, it is
only because it is in his interest to do so given the risk of liability-it
can hardly be to his benefit to be held liable without an opportunity
to commit admittedly valuable resources to his defense.)
Thus, this argument against abandonment is merely that some of
the equities ordinarily favoring preclusion are absent when the party
raising the estoppel has not previously been a litigant. Those equities that remain must still be balanced by countervailing considerations, such as equitable risk distribution, if a persuasive case against
Bernhard is to be made.
Second, the abandonment of mutuality is said to be inherently
inconsistent with the principles of in personam jurisdiction. Moore
and Currier particularly stress the argument that the lack of mutuality would give an in rem aspect to a judgment:
The theory of an in personam. action is that a plaintiff asserts a claim
against a named defendant, who is personally subject to the court's
jurisdiction. . . .
As a general proposition, the effect of an in personam. judgment
should extend only to the parties before the court and non-parties who
bear to parties such a legal relationship, usually termed privity, th~t the
judgment should both avail and conclude them. The doctrine of mutuality aids in keeping the in personam judgment within such proper
bounds. . . .
To its doctrine of mutuality the common law made certain exceptions, which expand the effect of the judgment in keeping with reason
and experience, without surrendering in personam. principles and without giving the in personam judgment an in rem twist.A6

This analysis is consistent with their preferred definition of mutuality, ie., that the relevant inquiry is into the identity of the parties
involved rather than whether they are mutually bound.A7
ff]he requirement of identity or privity of parties is sufficiently broad
to relegate the doctrine of mutuality to a relatively insignificant role.
The functions of limiting the persons entitled to assert the conclusive effect of a judgment in personam. is clearly one of great importance, and an organic part of the theory of the in personam action.As

If mutuality is defined as an inherent element of in personam
jurisdiction, and if it is assumed that the nature of jurisdiction itself
AS.
313, 329
A6.
A1.
AS.

See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University oflllinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
(1971).
Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 301. See also id. at 310.
See note 1 supra.
Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 330.
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is somehow sacrosanct, the problem disappears. In defining the
scope of the preclusive effect to be given a judgment with respect to
the parties involved, only two meaningful questions can be asked:
Who is to be benefited and who to be burdened? In rem and in
personam jurisdiction are merely paradigms. In the classic in personam case, only those who appear can be bound by the judgment or
invoke its benefits. The judgment speaks exclusively to the relationship between the persons present. In the pure in rem case, the judgment addresses the relationship between the party present and the
whole world, present or not. But these paradigms tell us nothing
about who should or should not be benefited or burdened in a particular case. Nor are they helpful in deciding whether the burdens
and benefits should necessarily be coextensive.
The rules of privity, which Moore and Currier find unobjectionable, extend the effect of a judgment to persons not actually parties
and in that sense give an in rem twist to in personam jurisdiction,
albeit to a fairly limited degree. But the use of the term "privity" is
a verbal manipulation which merely preserves the integrity of the in
rem/in personam dichotomy through the fiction that those in privity
are in some sense within the boundaries of the term "party." Usually, there are sound policy reasons for doing so. But we should not
become so enthralled with clever fictions that we forget that they
look to substantive policies for their vitality.A9
The Bernhard doctrine gives an in rem aspect to the benefits of a
judgment without disturbing the in personam nature of the burden.
To that extent, Moore and Currier are correct. But that hardly answers the fundamental question whether that effect is desirable.
Third, it is claimed that the abandonment of mutuality may, perversely, increase litigation even though the number of trials is decreased.
[l]t is possible that the desirability of conclusiveness of determinations
is not necessarily compatible with the desirability of minimizing litigation. Where the doctrine is applied in an individual case, it does operate both to put an end to litigation of a particular issue and to
minimize litigation between the parties in the subsequent suit in which
it is applied. But any tendency to extend the conclusive effects of matters previously adjudicated might easily tend to intensify the effort expended in the initial litigation and might increase the probability of
resort to appeal, particularly where the determination could affect
causes of action not involved in the current litigation. This would
seem especially true if the conclusive effect were extended to other actions not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the initial action.A 10
A9. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J., concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, Comment a
(1942); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, SO IOWA L. REV, 27, 44-45 (1964),
AlO. Polasky, supra note 1, at 220.
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Polasky's argument is general. It can be addressed to all collateral estoppel cases. Indeed, Polasky did not intend to confine his
remarks to multiparty cases. Others have deemed the argument
particularly persuasive in such circumstances.A 11
The first argument, that litigation efforts would be wastefully intensified at the trial level, is misconceived. Because it extends the
scope of liability, the possibility of collateral estoppel will cause the
parties to fight harder than they would if the judgment were binding
only with respect to the present parties, but economies of scale will
also be achieved. That is, one trial-0f two related "claims" should be
less costly to both the parties and to the state than would two trials of
one claim each, unless the efforts of the parties are somehow disproportionate to the liability at stake.
This first argument also seems to suppose that when future litigation is unforeseeable (that is, appears highly unlikely) or otherwise
contingent, the parties will press their claims as vigorously as they
would if future claims were certain to follow. There is no reason for
the litigants to so respond, however. A claim that is unlikely to vest
must, after all, be discounted when estimating the magnitude of the
liability that turns on the initial verdict. Even if the parties are risk
averse, so that, for example, a 10% chance of losing $100 is considered more serious than an actual loss of $10 in increased litigation
costs, the economies achieved by precluding retrial of issues previously determined are unlikely to be exceeded by the additional expenditure incurred at the initial trial. Given diminishing returns to
investment in litigation, the amount invested should be smaller, in
proportion to the liability, as the liability increases.
Polasky's suggestion that extending the scope of collateral estoppel may also induce appeals that might otherwise not be brought is
particularly unfortunate. If an appeal serves a valuable function but
is not economically justifiable until the liability crosses a certain
threshold, then the aggregation of claims via collateral estoppel
might lead to a more functional allocation of litigation resources
even if it does add to the appellate caseload. In other words, an
economy of scale for the litigant may be achieved.
Although the abandonment of mutuality may lead to such economies and, therefore, to more litigation in a particular case, it is no
A 11. See Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 10-12; Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 309; cf.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1941) (even
though judgment was held res judicata against person who secretly defended the suit on behalf
of the record defendant, the court stated that the secret defendant could not have benefited
from a favorable verdict since "to allow the secret defendant to have the advantage of the rule
would be 'to force a plaintiff to prosecute to the utmost suits which, for personal or pecuniary
reasons, he wishes to let slide'") (quoting 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (1939); von Moschzisker, supra note 1, at 303 (arguing that the real reason for the mutuality rule is that a party may
not wish to establish or defend his position to the utmost in a given suit).
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more likely to result in an overall increase in litigation than collateral estoppel in general. On the other hand, while overall economies of scale may be desirable, should an individual litigant be
forced to bear the accompanying costs in the form of an unfair share
of the litigation risks?
Fourth, it is said that the abandonment of mutuality inequitably
burdens the common party's litigation resources and prevents him
from allocating those resources rationally and efficiently. This criticism has two elements: (1) that, absent mutuality, the common party
cannot know how much to invest in any one trial because he does
not know whether there will be future litigation; and (2) that the
common party is disadvantaged by the lack of mutuality because the
possibility of multiple litigation and the fear that one loss will preclude him in all subsequent suits prevent a rational, effective allocation of litigation resources among the multiple trials.A 12
Greenebaum, for example, criticized the result in Zdanok v. Glidden
Co. ,A13 in which the defendant was held to a prior judgment adjudicating five claims in a subsequent suit involving 160 claims. Although the court had dismissed the unfairness argument because the
defendant common party knew at the time of the first trial of the
existence of the claims, Greenebaum felt it "unfair to require a party
to litigate as though 165 claims are at stake when he has the opportunity to win with respect to only five."A 14
The first element of the criticism is not peculiar to multiparty
cases. The unforeseeability or uncertainty of future claims when the
issue is first litigated is the fundamental constraint on the availability
of collateral estoppel generally. When the extent of future liability
was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the initial suit and the
liability in the subsequent suit turns out to be substantially disproportionate to the claim actually decided, preclusive effect is characteristically denied to the prior judgment.Ats
The second element misperceives the problem. Greenebaum
seems to be suggesting that the common party must invest in each
trial as though all outstanding claims are at stake and that this has
two possible consequences: either the resources he allocates to a
given trial will be inadequate for the risk that he bears, or, if he
expends the funds necessary to mount a proper effort and is forced to
do so several times until he finally loses and is precluded, he will
have spent far more than would be necessary under mutuality.
The full and fair opportunity doctrine is essentially designed to
remedy any severe misallocations of litigation resources that result
Al2. See Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 2-3.
A13. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
A14. Greenebaum, supra note 6, at 15.
AIS. See note 1 supra.
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from collateral estoppel. Greenebaum suggests that the lack of mutuality ipso facto results in resource misallocations sufficient to invoke the full and fair opportunity doctrine. In other words, he
claims that the full and fair opportunity requirement, the only constraint supposedly remaining when mutuality is abandoned, cannot,
because of the litigation burden imposed, be met when mutuality is
abandoned.
But the notion that resource misallocation lies at the heart of the
case against Bernhard is simply wrong. The common party can allocate his resources rationally and can enjoy a full and fair opportunity to litigate in each trial. It might seem that the optimal strategy
is to litigate each case as though all outstanding claims were at stake.
But if there are many claims, it is unlikely that the common party
will reach the last case undefeated unless the probability of success
in a given suit is extremely high. Alternatively, it might seem sensible to concentrate heavily on the early suits, so that at least they are
not lost. But, in fact, the common party's actual total risk at each
stage is not too much greater than the risk involved in a single claim,
and he should spend accordingly.
If, for example, there are five claims, each worth $200, and the
probability of success in a single suit is .5, the expected loss under
Bernhard is $806.25. (If the common party is a plaintiff this represents the amount he can expect not to recover. His expected recovery is therefore $193.75.) He calculates his risks in an individual
trial in the following manner.
If he reaches the fifth case without having suffered a loss, his risk
is $200 and his expected average loss is therefore $100. At the inception of the fourth suit there are two possibilities: he can lose, at a
cost of $400, or win and expect to lose $100 thereafter. Of course, he
cannot actually lose $ 100 since the only possible outcomes in the
fifth suit are O or $200, but $100 is the value of the loss to him while
it remains contingent. As he commences the fourth suit he therefore
has $300 at risk. That is the amount he can expect to save by defending successfully. At the inception of the third suit he can lose,
at a cost of $600, or win and expect to lose $250 thereafter. The
amount at risk is thus only $350, since he expects to lose $250 in any
event.
Carrying the process through yields the results tabulated below.
(Note that the $1612.50 multiplied by the .5 probability ofloss yields
the expected loss. One way to think about the impact of Bernhard
in this case is to suppose that it increases the amount at stake for the
common party.) Finally, in oi:der to determine the truly optimal
strategy the common party must take into account the costs that will
be avoided if he loses prior to the last suit and is estopped to litigate
further.
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Amount at Risk

I

$ 387.50
375.00
350.00
300.00
200.00
$1612.50

2
3
4
5

TABLE

F

For illustrative purposes, the following table should prove helpful.
$

%

$

%

IO

5
14
22
29
35

60
70
80
90
100

40
44
47
49
50

20
30
40

50

TABLE

G

The first and third columns represent trial expenditure, the other columns a hypothetical probability of success for each expenditure.
Each successive $10 investment buys a smaller increment in the
chances of success.
In this hypothetical situation, a suit for $1000 justifies an expenditure of $100. The last $10 purchases a 1% increment in the
probability with a value of $1000 x .01 = $10. A $200 claim justifies an expenditure of $60. Thus, if five $200 claims are tried separately under mutuality, the litigant's optimal expenditure is $300,
and his expected loss is $600 (he has a .4 probability of success), a
total expected loss of $900.
Under Bernhard, if the cases are tried separately the optimal expenditure at each point can be calculated as before, by starting with
the last suit and performing an iterative computation. In the last
suit the risk is $200, and the optimal expenditure is therefore $60.
The expected loss is $120 which, added to the cost of the trial, yields
a total expected loss of $180. At the outset of the fourth suit there
are two possibilities: a loss at a cost of $400 or a win with an expected loss thereafter of $180. The amount at risk is therefore $220,
and the optimal expenditure is still $60. The entire calculation is
tabulated below.
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Trial
No.

Amount at
Risk

Trial
Cost

p
(ofloss)

1
2
3
4

$232
231
229
220
200

$60
60
60
60
60

.6
.6

$11l2

$300

5

TABLE

.6
.6
.6

H

The amounts do not greatly exceed $200 because a loss avoids additional trial expenses and because the later claims are highly contingent. The expected average-loss is $1112 X .6 = $667, and when it is
added to the trial costs-the costs of five full trials must be added
because the trial costs avoided are already figured into the amounts
at risk-the total expected cost to the common party is $967, $67
more than under mutuality.
Loss on
Suit No.
1
2
3
4

5
No loss

p
.600
.240
.096
.Q38
.015
.010

Damages
Paid
(D)

Cumulative
trial costs
(C)

PxD

PxC

Total

$1000
800
600
400
200
-0-

$ 60
120
180
240
300
300

$600
192
58
15
3
-0-

$36
29
17
9
3

$636
221
75
. 24
8
3

$868

$99

$967

.999

5

J
This example demonstrates that a rational resource allocation is
possible without mutuality. The common party need not at any
stage spend amounts disproportionate to the then-current risk.
This is not to say, however, that the common party is not severely
disadvantaged by the lack of mutuality. Even when the trial model
is complicated by taking costs into account, the party facing multiple
adversaries without benefit of mutuality still lives in the worst of all
possible worlds. He can expect to pay $868 in damages, $268 more
than under mutuality, a sum only partially offset by expected sayings
in trial costs. (The small relative magnitude of the $67 increment in
overall costs is not significant because the figure can be varied arbitrarily by making suitable choices for the relative magnitudes of the
damages and the trial costs and by suitably varying the relationship
between trial expenditure and probability of success.)
To the extent that there are any resource misallocations uniquely
attributable to the abandonment of mutuality rather than to collateral estoppel in general, they burden not the common party but the
noncommon party who is the first to litigate. Ignoring trial costs
for the moment, it will be recalled that the common party had
$387.50 at stake in the first trial of the five. But·the noncommon
TABLE
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party has only $200 at stake. The difference, $187.50, is the effective
risk of the other noncommon parties who are not present. The
noncommon party will invest in the trial an amount commensurate
with his risk but will be outspent by the common party who has
more at stake. The consequent imbalance disadvantages the first
litigant in one of two ways: he must either spend somewhat more
than he would were only his claim involved if he is to compensate
for the additional expenditure by the common party, or he must face
diminished chances of success due to the imbalance in litigation expenditures.
What is unfair to the common party about the lack of mutuality
is the distribution of risks. When Greenebaum says, "It is unfair to
require a party to litigate as though 165 claims are at stake when he
has the opportunity to win with respect to only five," he is close to
the mark. But he errs in placing the emphasis on the litigation burden rather than on the risk of loss.
If the common party is induced to spend more at trial it is only
because he suffers greater risks without the mutuality requirement.
To tum Greenebaum's argument around, the fact that a procedural
change induces a litigant to increase his trial expenditure ought to
suggest that the change has subjected him to new risks. To argue
that he is unfairly burdened by the additional costs is akin to arguing
that battery ought to be outlawed only because it unfairly burdens
the victim with additional medical expenses. Litigation expenses,
like medical costs, are part of the cure, not part of the disease. They
are the litigant's means of minimizing the risk of loss to which he is
otherwise subjected. Assuming he is receiving fair value· for his litigation dollar, the additional expenses are to his advantage or his dollar would remain in his pocket. If the additional expenses are
objectionable, it is only because the risks that precipitate those expenses are objectionable. The ~ase against Bernhard is most importantly that the common party is forced to bear more than his fair
share of risk.
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.Derivation of Table IV
Once its underlying assumptions and analytic framework are understood, the method of calculating the risk distribution in Table IV
is easily followed. Any single "outcome,"B 1 and hence the identity
of the party ultimately bearing the loss, is determined by the verdicts
in at most three suits: plaintiff against the primary defendant (P v.
.D); plaintiff against the derivative defendant (!' v. S); and the derivative defendant against the primary defendant for indemnification
(S v. .D). The probability of any outcome can be calculated merely
by multiplying the probabilities of the component verdicts. For example, assuming that each party has a 50% case, the probability of
the plaintiff losing his suit against the primary defendant and winning against the derivative defendant who recovers against the primary defendant in an indemnity action is p(!'I.D andPwS andSw.D)
= p(PI.D) • p(PwS) • p(Sw.D) = .5 X .5 X .5 = .125.
Although combinatorial analysis suggests that two possible verdicts for each of three suits produces eight possible outcomes, not all
the outcomes are distinguishable for practical purposes. Where .D is
sued first, the outcomes Pw.D • PIS • Sw.D and Pw.D • PIS • SI.D
are equivalent to Pw.D • PIS, since S will have no liability for which
to seek indemnity. Similarly, PI.D • PIS • Sw.D and Pl.D • PIS •
SI.D reduces to Pl.D • PIS. Consequently, the eight theoretical outcomes are reduced to six practical ones. Equivalent reductions occur when S is sued first.
The six initial outcomes are reduced further by rules of preclusion, subrogation, and impleader. Consider the six possible outcomes where .D is sued first.
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Under an exception to mutuality, outcomes 4, 5, and 6 constitute the
single outcome Pl.D in which P bears the loss, since the loss to .D
precludes further litigation. If S is allowed to subrogate an indemBl. "Outcome" is defmed in note 143 supra.
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nity claim to a verdict for P against .D ,B2 then outcomes 1, 2, and 3
constitute the single outcome Pw.D and .D bears the loss. .D will ultimately bear liability because either P will lose a subsequent suit
against S or S will be automatically indemnified following a loss to

P.
Similarly, the number of possible outcomes would be reduced if
S were allowed to implead.D,B3 or to vouch in .D when he is subsequently sued by P, irrespective of whether .D won his case.B4 Outcomes 1 and 2 would equalPw.D • PwS and outcomes 4 and 5 would
equal Pl.D • PwS. Stated another way, outcomes 1, 2, 4, and 5
would constitute the outcome of a verdict for P against .D, with .D
bearing the loss.
Finally, consider the result when S is precluded from initiating
an indemnity action against .D if .D has previously prevailed against
P.Bs This rule would reduce outcomes 4 and 5 to the single outcome
Pl.D • PwS, with S bearing the loss.
Associated with each outcome is a party who ultimately bears the
loss. And corresponding to any set of rules of preclusion, subrogation, and impleader are a set of outcome probabilities. By combining the probabilities for outcomes that result in the same party
bearing the loss, a risk distribution can be determined for each set of
rules. Assume, for example, that there is no preclusion, no subrogation of S to P 's judgment, and no impleader. Then compare the
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TABLEK
B2. See REsTATE.MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 95, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1976). But see REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 107 (1942).
B3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
B4. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 107 (1942).
BS. But see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 99, Comment b (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1976).
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distribution produced when S can seek indemnity from .D even
though .D has successfully defended an action by P with the distribution produced when he cannot. These alternative sets of rules produce the following outcome probabilities and risk distributions.
The difference between the two risk distributions is accounted for
by the shift of .125 from .D's risk to S's. This shift results from the
fact that the outcome Pl.D • PwS • Sw.D has been eliminated by the
rule that PIJJ precludes a suit for indemnity. Thus, whenever the
verdict PwS follows Pl.D, S bears the loss.
The technique illustrated in these two examples was applied to
all possible combinations for the rules discussed above to generate
Table L. The risk distributions presented in Table IV are simply
those calculated in Table L.
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